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Aligning Emerging Global Strategies to Combat
Corporate Corruption: From a "Two Thrust
Approach" to a "Two Swords One Thrust
Strategy" of Compliance, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and Sovereign Investor Oversight
in China
LARRY CATA BACKER*

I.

Introduction

Who cares about corruption?' In September 2017, the media reported
that parliamentarians at the Council of Europe had been bribed by
Azerbaijan to mute criticism of their government within the Council's
human rights organs.2 Also in September 2017, France's financial
prosecutor announced the commencement of a corruption investigation
against the son of the former president of the International Association of
Athletics Federations for payments to influence the choice of host cities for
the largest global sporting events. 3 At the same time, authorities in Brazil
launched a probe into vote buying for the 2016 Olympics, a criminal
* l W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar Professor of Law and International
Affairs, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. My great thanks to
Zhang Lei qKf of Beijing Normal University who has been an inspiration for this article.
Great appreciation to my research assistant GAO Shan
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[Sword One Thrust Strategy" to Combat Criminal Corruption: Corporate
Compliance, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and Sovereign Investor Oversight, JILIN UNIV. J. UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF SoC. SCI.]SocIAL SCIENCE] 58(2): 17-30 (2018).
1. See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 807, 807822 (2006) (arguing that anti-bribery laws abroad may act as a deterrent against engaging in
corruption in foreign countries, but that corruption results in relatively higher FDJ from
countries with high levels of corruption).
2. See Jennifer Rankin, Azerbaian Revelations Spark 'Great Concern' at Council of Europe: News
of Country's $2.9bn Lobbying and Money-Laundering Scheme Could HeraldShake- Up at Rights Body,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5,2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/azerbaijanrevelations-could-herald-shake-up-at-council-of-europe?CMP=share btn fb ("The details of
the payments came as an independent panel began confidential hearings into alleged corruption
at [the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe] Pace in Strasbourg, one of the
world's oldest human rights bodies.").
3. See French ProsecutorPins Corruption in IAAF on Son of Ex-President, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 5,
2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170905-france-french-prosecutor-pins-corruption-iaafson-ex-president?ref=fb.
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offense. 4 In January 2016, the Norwegian Pension Fund Global intensified
its efforts to engage in more aggressive anti-corruption investment
strategies.5 In December 2013, Vietnam reported that it had sentenced
bankers to death in connection with embezzlement from a state owned
bank.6
It's a message to those in this game to be less greedy and that business
as usual is getting out of hand," said Adam McCarty, chief economist
with the Hanoi-based consulting firm Mekong Economics. "The
message to people in the system is this: Your chances of getting caught
are increasing," McCarty said. "Don't just rely on big people above
you. Because some of these [perpetrators] would've had big people
above them. And it didn't help them.7
It is noteworthy that Colombia, shortly after the peace settlement ending
fifty years of civil war, turned its attention to the control of criminal
corruption in response to corruption scandals involving transnational
corporations that reached to the office of the president of the republic. 8
"Already seven people have been jailed in the case, including a former
senator and an ex-vice minister of transport. The attorney general also
asked the Supreme Court of Justice to investigate five other members of
congress. "9
In China, Ding Ning, the chairman of Yucheng Group, was recently
sentenced to life in prison for his role in an online lending fraud scheme. 10
In August 2017, "[t]he Supreme People's Procuratorate said China would
4. See Brazil Police Launch Raid to Probe Vote-Buying for 2016 Olympics, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 5,
2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170905-brazil-police-launch-raid-probe-vote-buying2016-olympics?reffb.
5. Norvay Fund Blacklists China's 'Corrupt' ZTE, Loc. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.thelocal.no/
20160107/norway-fund-blacklists-chinas-zte-over-corruption/ ("The world's biggest sovereign
wealth fund, Norway's public pension fund, has divested from Chinese telecom equipment
maker ZTE because of corruption fears, the Norwegian central bank which manages the fund
said on Thursday."); see also Decision on Exclusion of Company from the Government's Pension Fund
Global, NORGES BANK (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/news-list/2016/
decision-on-exclusion-of-company- from-the-government-pension-fund-global/.
6. See Patrick Winn, Vietnam Is Sentencing Corrupt Bankers to Death, by Firing Squad, PRI
(Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-03/vietnam-sentencing-corrupt-bankersdeath-firing-squad ("In March, a 57-year-old former regional boss from Vietnam Development
Bank, another government-run bank, was sentenced to death over a $93-million swindling
job").
7. Id.
8. Juan Manuel Bedoya-Palacio, Colombia Enters the Age of Enforcement, THE FCPA BLOG
(Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/31/juan-manuel-bedoya-palaciocolombia-enters-the-era-of-enforc.html.
9. Id.
10. See Ding Ning: China's Biggest Ponzi Scheme Mastermind Sentenced to Life in Prison, THE
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/chinaponzi-scheme-ding-ning-yucheng-group-prison-sentence-ezubo-beijing-a794181 1.html.
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strictly crack down on any crimes that seriously damaged financial security
and that destroyed financial orders.""
Corruption, especially bribery, has become a matter of international
concern. The United Nations (U.N.) Global Compact, a voluntary
initiative between large enterprises under the leadership of the U.N.
committed to implement universal sustainability principles and to take steps
to support U.N. goals, is built around ten principles.12 Its tenth principle
states that "[b]usinesses should work against corruption in all its forms,
including extortion and bribery."' 13 The U.N. Global Compact has
expressed the view that "[c]orruption is a considerable obstacle to economic
and social development around the world. It has negative impacts on
sustainable development and particularly affects poor communities.' 14 In
that respect, the U.N. Global Compact highlights a "two thrust" attack on
corruption. "New and tougher anti-corruption regulations continue to
emerge worldwide. All companies need robust anti-corruption measures
and practices to protect their reputations and the interests of their
stakeholders.",5
These "two thrusts"-the first consisting of national legislation (criminal
and civil) and the second consisting of corporate self-regulation against
corruption-have become the foundation of contemporary measures to
combat corruption, especially when committed by individuals within the
largest public or private enterprises.16 The extent of national legislation and
international efforts to make national legislation coherent is well known.'t
National efforts continue to develop. For example, in 2017, the government
of the United Kingdom adopted the Criminal Finances Act of 2017.18 In
addition, the range of international agreements respecting corruption
11. Stella Qiu & Vincent Lee, China's Top Prosecutor to Intensify Crackdown on FinancialCrimes,
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-finance-crime/chinas-top-

REUTERS

prosecutor-to-intensify-crackdown-on-financial-crimes-idUSL4N1L841V ("This year, high
profile regulators who have been caught up in President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive
include the former head of the insurance regulator, former vice chairman of the securities
regulator and former assistant chairman of banking regulator.").
12. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://
www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) ("The ten
principles are derived from: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption").
13. Id.
14. Anti-Corruption, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/
our-work/governance/anti-corruption (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
15. Id.

16. See, e.g., DIMITRI VLASSLS, The U.N. Convention Against Corruption OriginsAnd Negotiation
Process in 66 RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES 126 (2005).
17. See, e.g., id.
18. Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22 (U.K.). The Act made provisions in connection with
terrorist property and created corporate offenses for cases where a person associated with a
corporate body or partnership facilitates a tax evasion offense.
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touches virtually every country on earth.19 The international community has
also adopted some soft law instruments with some influence in developing
customary standards of conduct and expectations in economic relations.20 In
the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has served as a
model, variations of which have been adopted elsewhere.21 The Criminal
Law of the People's Republic of China prohibits "official bribery," which
applies to state officials and state entities, as well as "commercial bribery,"
which applies to virtually everyone else.22 A great number of other states
have enacted anti-bribery and corruption laws as well.23
Recent reports from the global financial sector have highlighted the way
in which this "two thrusts" strategy has also begun to be felt by actors in
financial markets, especially by those firms that are in the business of
investing in or lending to operating companies worldwide. In one recent
case,
[a]n American mutual fund manager said in an SEC filing [] that it sold
all shares it held in Petrofac because of an ongoing corruption
19. See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Corruption, Dec. 9,2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41;
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, Sept. 29,
2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 J.L.M. 5; Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999,
Eur. T.S. No. 174 (open to non-member states); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan.
27, 1999, Eur. T.S. No. 173 (open to non-member states; Additional Protocol to the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption, May 15, 2003, Eur. T.S. No. 191 provides that adhering states
embed in their national criminal law the criminalization of active and passive bribery in both the
public and private sectors, including bribery of members of foreign and domestic parliamentary
assemblies and of officials of international organizations); OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (open to all OECD countries and some non-member countries);
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (open to all OECD countries and some
non-member countries).
20. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 51/191, Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions, (Dec. 16, 1996). For a review of how this declaration fits into the
broader context of the fight against corruption, see VLAssls, supra note 16.
21. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see also D. Michael
Crites, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at Thirty-Five: A Practitioner'sGuide, 73 OHIO ST. LJ.
1049 (2012).

22. See Hui Xu & Sean Wu, Bribery and Corruption: China, GLOBAL

LEGAL INSIGHTS

(2018),

https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption/global-legalinsights -bribery-and-corruption/china;
see also Ron Cheng, Why US Companies Should be
Paying Attention to China's New Anti-Corruption Laws, FORBES (July 27, 2016), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2016/07/27/why-us-companies-should-be-paying-attention-tochinas-new-anti-corruption-laws/#6905e4a41db1.
23. The International Bar Association has created a database with the relevant anti-bribery
laws from fifty-six states, as well as international conventions. See National Anti-Bribery
Legislation, INT'L B. Assoc. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/CriminalLaw_
Section/AntiCorruptionCommittee/Resources.aspx
("texts of international anti-bribery
conventions as well as the anti-bribery legislation of a number of countries [are] accurate as of 1
December 2014").
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investigation by the UK's Serious Fraud Office. That SFO
investigation is focused on Petrofac's past relationship with Unaoil.
Ohio National Fund, Inc. said the "escalating fraud investigation seems
to us a thesis changer."24
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has noted the
priority to which it has given corruption cases under the FCPA; its
enforcement actions suggest the preference for civil penalties as punishment
for violations of the Act.25 The complex nature of the extraterritorial effects
of anti-corruption measures and the weaknesses of arguments against such
efforts have also been noted.26 Indeed, financial institutions, and most
notably, sovereign wealth funds, have begun to more vigorously defend
against corruption by building anti-corruption measures and requirements
into their investment strategies as well as in their shareholding policies.27
Related to these emerging trends is another-the increasing emphasis on
monitoring and compliance programs imposed formally and informally on
and by enterprises.28 Governments incentivize this obligation by their
willingness to enforce cooperation agreements with enterprises facing
corruption probes in order to avoid criminal sanction.29 These have been
24. Richard L. Cassin, Fund Dumps Petrofac Shares on SFO Probe Concerns, THE FCPA BLOG
(Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/8/fund-dumps-petrofac-shares-on-sfoprobe-concems.html. Petrofac designs, builds, operates, and maintains oil and gas facilities
worldwide. Our Story, PETROFAC.COM, https://www.petrofac.com/en-gb/about-us/our-story/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018). Unaoil provides "industrial solutions to the energy sector in the
Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. These include green and brownfield Engineering and
Construction, Workforce Solutions, Operations and Maintenance, and the provision of niche
equipment and products, such as production chemicals." Chairman's Message, UNAOIL.COM,
http://www.unaoil.com/about/chairman-s -message/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). On July 19,
2016, the U.K. Serious Frauds Office (SFO) issued a Press Release in which they announced
that the SFO is "conducting a criminal investigation into the activities of Unaoil, its officers, its
employees and its agents in connection with suspected offences of bribery, corruption and
money laundering." Unaoil Investigation, SFO.coM (July 19, 2016), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/
2016/07/19/unaoil -investigation/. See generally, Unaoil, SFO.coM (July 18, 2018), https://
www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/unaoil/.
25. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC.Gov, https://www.sec.gov/spotlightlfcpa/fcpacases.shtml (last updated Oct. 2, 2018) (listing companies and amounts of civil penalties from
2018 back to 1978). U.S.
26. See Larry Cata Backer, Soft Extra Territorialismand Anti-Corruption Campaigns: On the

Perverse Folly of CorruptStates, LAW

AT THE END OF THE DAY

(Sept. 15, 2006), http://lcbacker

blog.blogspot.com/2006/09/soft-extra-territorialism-and-anti.html.
27. See Bestemmelser om forvaltningen av States pensjonsfond, 21. Dec. 2005, nr. 123.
28. See Alun Milford, Alun Milford on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, SFO.Gov (Sept. 5,
2017), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/201 7/09/05/alun-milford-on-deferred-prosecution- agreements/.
29. On U.S., Canadian, and U.K. government's view of what constitutes an effective

compliance program, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-47.120 (2018)
[hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL]; Corporate Compliance Programs, CANADA.CA, http://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03927.html; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE
BRIBERY

ACT 2010:

GUIDANCE

(2010).
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advanced in the United States3 0 and in the United Kingdom. 31 What makes
this interesting is the way that governments, having created a strong
tradition of respecting the autonomy of corporations even when they are
subsidiaries, now seek to treat production chains as a single enterprise for
purposes of corruption probes. Most interesting among these efforts is the
so-called Pilot Program launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in April
2016,32 which was designed to encourage company self-reporting and
cooperation to avoid exercises of prosecutorial discretion to seek criminal
penalties against companies or their employees. 33 Additional due diligence
efforts may be required under provisions of the U.K.'s Criminal Finances
Act of 2017. 34 Under this Act, an enterprise may well incur criminal and
civil liability for acts attributable to it occurring within its supply chain if
connected with torture involving public officials. 35 In Brazil, the Clean
Companies Act36 includes a leniency provision permitting state prosecutors
to enter a "deferred prosecution deal for companies willing to plead guilty
and settle corruption charges." 37 The effect is that the legal relationships
among corporate enterprises or between corporations and their clients (with
whom there may be no ownership relationship) are now treated as irrelevant
for purposes of criminal investigation.38
These trends tend to challenge the traditional legal and societal principles
for the organization of business and its responsibilities. They also point to a
30. See U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

(2017),

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/93 7501/download.
JUSTICE MANLAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.000.
31. See, e.g., U.K. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).
32. See U.S.

PROGRAMS

See generally,

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION'S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

ENFORCEMENT

PLAN AND

GUIDANCE

(2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-

entry/file/83 8386/download.
33. See id. The Press Release explained that the Pilot Program was in part "designed to
motivate companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct, fully cooperate with
the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, remediate flaws in their controls and compliance
programs" U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program,

(April 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opalblog/criminal-divisionlaunches -new-fcpa-pilot-program.
34. See Criminal Finances Act 2017 (U.K.); see also Richard J. Rogers & Sasho Todorov,

JUSTICE.GOV

Compliance Alert: Due Diligence Under the UK s CriticalFinancesAct of 2017, THE FCPA BLOG
(Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/7/compliance-alert-due-diligenceunder-the -uks -criminal-financ.html.
35. Rogers & Todorov, supra note 34 ("if a company is unfortunate enough to identify a Gross
Human Rights Abuse with which it is connected, it may wish to consider proactively
investigating the allegations. This will help the company beat civil society to the punch, and
will demonstrate a good faith effort to mitigate any potential violations.").
36. Lei No. 12,846/13, de 13 Agosto 2013, DARiO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.8.2013
(Braz.).
37. Felipe Rocha dos Santos, New Guidancefor Brazil Anti-Corruption Settlements, THE FCPA
BLOG (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/7/felipe-rocha-dos-santos-newguidance -for-brazil-anti-corrupt.html. The settlements have proven controversial, and have
sometimes been blocked by the Brazilian Federal Prosecutor's Office for excessive leniency. Id.
38. See Lei No. 12,846/13.
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new and heightened importance of corruption for both states and financial
institutions. The trends suggest some of the ways in which legal systems and
the practices of large institutions in global markets have been contributing to
changes in the frameworks within which corruption is detected, controlled,
and punished. This article first examines two less well known elements of
the "two thrusts" approach to corruption that focus on corporate compliance
programs. The first is the use of sovereign investing as a tool for the
correction of corruption and the supervision of institutional reform to avoid
future corruption. The second is the use of prosecutorial discretion to allow
legal regimes to manage corporate compliance programs. In the former case,
state officials use private power to aid corporate self-regulation; in the latter
case, state officials use public authority to devolve supervision to corporate
surveillance mechanisms.39
In the next section, the article considers the way in which sovereign wealth
funds are emerging as potentially useful instruments of corruption
management. The section that follows briefly considers the utility of
government policies that favor settlement and cooperation agreements to
manage company efforts at corruption self-regulation in the context of
sovereign lending practices that aid in anti-corruption efforts. The effect,
though little publicized, can be quite potent-a "Two Swords One Thrust"
can serve as another effective strategy in governmental and private efforts to
combat corruption. The "Two Swords One Thrust" strategy combines the
power of state officials to exercise discretion in managing anti-corruption
laws and the authority of financial institutions to control the access of
enterprises to their investment universe or to exercise their shareholder
authority to influence corporate behavior. This article suggests briefly the
utility of this strategy for Chinese anti-corruption efforts. Within China, it
may be possible to coordinate compliance efforts by the procuratorate with
that of the Chinese sovereign wealth funds through the medium of social
credit systems currently being developed.

II. One Sword: Prosecutorial Discretion and Compliance
Systems
The majesty of domestic legal orders, and to some extent international law
embedded in such orders, is tempered by the power vested in state officials
to exercise discretion in deciding when and how to apply the law against
those subject to its strictures. Though the abuse of prosecutorial discretion
is a constant problem in many systems 40 and can be a mark of systemic
corruption,4 1 it has never been viewed as corruptive enough to eliminate
39. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29,

§ 9-28.000;

Bestemmelser om forvatningen av States

pensjonsfond, nr. 123.
40. See Donald A. Daugherty, The Separation of Powers and Abuses in ProsecutorialDiscretion, 79
J. CRIM. L. & CRLMINOLOGY 953 (1988-1989).

41. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Allowing Some Illegal Immigrants to Stay Abuses Prosecutorial

Discretion, N.Y. TIES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/18/
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discretionary power in the prosecutor. 42 Prosecutorial discretion is usually
understood in terms of individual decisions with respect to a specific
individual or entity subject to investigation. But many states have permitted
the development of rules for the institutionalization of prosecutorial
discretion. 43 The efforts to build a cage of regulation around the decision to
enforce the law have some benefits. The regulations provide guidance and
reduce the likelihood that personal rather than institutional objectives are
the primary basis for exercises of discretion. They also provide notice to
people and entities subject to the law to permit them to better manage their
behavior so they may avoid legal entanglements and violation of law. With
respect to this last point, the institutionalization of discretion effectively
provides persons and institutions subject to law a safe harbor against
prosecution if they agree to follow the rules under which prosecutors are
instructed to refrain from bringing legal proceedings.
Some jurisdictions, such as the United States and Brazil, have
institutionalized rules for exercising prosecutorial discretion and the safe
harbors produced under such rules; they have also developed mechanisms
that empower prosecutors to enter into binding agreements to defer
44
prosecution and to impose conditions for the support of the agreement.
Prosecutors not only use [deferred and non-prosecution agreements
(D/NPAs)] to sanction firms, they also use them to ... impose mandates
on firms that require them to change their internal governance or
business practices. These D/NPA mandates thus enable prosecutors to
create and impose new legal duties whose breach can subject the firm to
45
criminal sanction.
The exercise of prosecutorial power in this way has been criticized for
expanding the power to effectively impose conduct norms on corporations in
derogation of the traditional powers of legislatures to establish these basic
rules for liability.46 Yet it is not necessarily fair to suggest that prosecutors
constitutional- limits-of-presidential -action-on-immigration- 12/allowing-some-illegalimmigrants-to-stay-abuses-prosecutorial-discretion?mcubz=0 ("But would it be prosecutorial
discretion if the president instructed U.S. attorneys to prosecute only heroin cases, and ignore
other drugs prohibited by federal law, such as cocaine, P.C.P. or methamphetamine? . . . Most
people would think such acts . . . would . . . constitute a rewriting of the law and violate the
president's constitutional duty."); see generally ANGELA J. DAviS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2009).
42. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standardfor the Prosecutor'sExercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 513 (1993); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION

(AM. BAR

ASS'N

2015).

43. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.000.
44. See Jennifer Arlen, ProsecutingBeyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191 (2016) (criticizing this trend as in
violation of rule of law principles).
45. Id. at 192.
46. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, DeferredProsecutionAgreements on Trial: Lessonsfrom the Law of
UnconstitutionalConditions in PROSECUTOR IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO
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use their discretion to create new legal standards without guidance. It might
be more useful to understand the use of discretionary authority and its
institutionalization in policy as a means through which prosecutors can
effectively legalize societal norms and aspirations. In this sense, deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) and, more generally, policies on charging
for violations in the face of cooperation and compliance, institutionalize
corporate governance principles that reflect emerging customs and patterns
of behavior in corporate behavior. For example,
[the U.K.'s deferred prosecution agreement system] is based on the
American model but differs significantly from it in the requirement for
judicial confirmation that the entry into a DPA in the particular case is
in the interests of justice and that the proposed agreement's terms are
fair, reasonable and proportionate. The court's reasons for its decision
must be published, subject always to a power to delay publication where
4
it might affect a fair trial of individuals. 7
Brazil follows the same model.48 In the United States, whether such
institutional rules for constraining prosecutorial discretion or the D/NPSs
produced through them require judicial scrutiny, exceed the administrative
authority of prosecutors, or otherwise should be a matter of concern for the
appropriate U.S. governmental apparatus is an issue left for others. 49 The
effectiveness of using discretionary state power to change enterprise
behaviors as a means of addressing the issue of corruption appears to change
the dynamics of behavior between the state and enterprises. It has moved
the relationship from an adversarial one to one grounded in cooperation. It
is true that this cooperation is coerced and its parameters are entirely
controlled by the state. But to the extent that cooperation-through the
development of transparent compliance systems-furthers the governmental
policies of suppressing bribery and corruption, it reflects an effective
implementation of a political choice among core political values.
What is it that these DPAs provide, and how do institutional rules around
prosecutorial discretion contribute to managing the challenge of corruption
in economic enterprises? A consideration of the parameters of the U.S.
approach is instructive. Since 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice has
established guidelines for prosecuting corporations and other business
organizations.50 These guidelines provide parameters for federal prosecutors
38 (Anthony Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., 2011); Jennifer
Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
47. Milford, supra note 28.
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT

48. See Santos, supra note 37.

49. See, e.g., Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Governance, 50 B.C. L. REv. 949 (2009);
Laurence Cunningham, DeferredProsecutionsand Corporate Governance: An IntegratedApproach to
Investigationand Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2015); David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecutionand
Non-ProsecutionAgreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295
(2013).
50. SeeJUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.000 (2018).
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and do not create any enforceable rights in parties involved in litigation with
the government. 51 The U.S. federal approach is built around the Justice
Manual promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice, specifically the
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (PBO).52 It
ought to be noted that while the PBO is meant to provide instructions for
binding others, it does not itself bind the government. 53 The purpose of the
Manual is to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but at the same
time to base that on the willingness of individuals and enterprises to change
their behavior in accordance with the factors used to guide the exercise of
54
discretion.
The PBO starts with an expression of policy-the fundamental principle
that the prosecution of corporate crime is a high priority. 55 The object of
this policy is the protection of the economic integrity of the U.S. market
system "at the expense of the public interest."56 To that end, the basic
approach is to charge the most serious offense that is consistent with the
nature of the wrongdoing.s7 The foundation of the policy is to prosecute
individuals rather than the entity on whose behalf they may be acting.s8
The PBO then produces its own aggregated interpretation of the law of
state corporate fiduciary duty (over which it has no authority to tinker with
or change, much less interpret).59 The Department of Justice has chosen to
split that duty into two parts: first, a duty to shareholders, who are described
as "the corporation's true owners, "60 and second, a generalized duty of
honest dealing with outsiders through regulatory filings and public
statements. 61 Regarding this federal initiative to enforce its own reading of
51. See id. § 1-1.200.
52. Id. § 9-28.000.
53. Id. § 9-28.1500.
54. "Since federal prosecutors have great latitude in making crucial decisions concerning
enforcement of a nationwide system of criminal justice, it is desirable, in the interest of the fair
and effective administration of justice in the federal system, that all federal prosecutors be
guided by a general statement of principles that summarizes appropriate considerations to be
weighed, and desirable practices to be followed, in discharging their prosecutorial
responsibilities." Id. § 9-27.110.
55. Id. § 9-28.010.
56. Id.
57. SeeJUSTICE MANLAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.1400.
58. Id. § 9-28.010. There are three reasons advanced for this approach. The first is that it is
easier to identify the full extent of enterprise-wrongdoing by following the misbehavior trails of
individuals. Id. Second, targeting individuals provides an easy way to intelligence that may
produce evidence of misconduct of more highly placed individuals within the company. Id.
Third, "we maximize the likelihood that the final resolution will include charges against
culpable individuals and not just the corporation." Id. This is emphasized in § 9-28.1300: "In
deciding whether to charge a corporation, prosecutors should consider whether charges against
the individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance will adequately satisfy the goals of
federal prosecution." Id. § 9-28.1300.
59. Id. § 9-28.100.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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fiduciary duty obligations imposed under state law (along with disclosure
obligations and general fraud duties that may be sourced elsewhere),
"prosecutors should be mindful of the common cause we share with
'
responsible corporate leaders who seek to promote trust and confidence."62
The object of prosecution, then, is at least in part to ensure cooperation and
to develop partnerships with corporate leaders to ensure the integrity of the
economic system within which both operate. This is to be achieved by
encouraging not just respect for the law but (in cooperation with prosecutors
at times) vigorous programs of compliance, evidenced by disclosures to
prosecutors and other officials as necessary, and self-regulation.63
On this general basis, the PBO builds its core general principle of
prosecution: "[c]orporations should not be treated leniently because of their
artificial nature nor should they be subject to harsher treatment ...
Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to be a force
for positive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent, discover, and
punish serious crimes."64 The governance effects of indicting corporations
are emphasized in the commentary to this PBO general principle.65 An
indictment is an efficient form of obtaining broad regulatory compliance and
self-regulation without the need for intervention of legislative or other
administrative bodies.66 In weighing whether civil or regulatory alternatives
are better suited to deal with misconduct, prosecutors must consider the
adequacy of those methods to "adequately deter, punish and rehabilitate a
corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct." 67 In any case, the goals
of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation are at the center of
68
discretionary decision making by the prosecutor.
Balanced against the quasi-legislative and administrative value of
prosecution is that of D/NPAs. From the core general principle, the PBO
builds a system of principles for exercising discretion in the prosecution of
business entities. The key principle is grounded on the determination, by
federal prosecutors, of the legal effect of corporate personality. Because, the
PBO insists, a corporate entity is little more than the sum of the actions of
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.200.
65. Id. § 9.28-200(B).
66. Id. ("For instance, corporations are likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is
indicted for criminal misconduct that is pervasive throughout a particular industry .... In
addition, a corporate indictment may result in specific deterrence by changing the culture of the

indicted corporation and the behavior of its employees. Finally,

. .

.there may therefore be a

substantial federal interest in indicting a corporation under such circumstances." Also, there is
an acknowledgment that prosecutors sometimes ought to defer to "civil and regulatory

authorities.").
67. Id. § 9-28.1200.
68. Id. § 1-12.000 ("Department prosecutors and civil attorneys handling white collar matters
should timely communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with one another and with agency
attorneys to the fullest extent appropriate to the case and permissible by law.).
See also id.

§ 1-12.100.
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individuals, it is the individual rather than the entity to which the prosecutor
ought to look in the first instance.69
Beyond the key principle of seeking to punish the individual, the PBO also
sets out factors that prosecutors ought to consider in exercising discretion.70
These include the nature and seriousness of the offense, the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the enterprise, the corporation's prior history of
misconduct, the willingness to cooperate with prosecutors, the value of
corporate compliance programs, the willingness to timely and voluntarily
confess to wrongdoing, the extent of corporate remedial action, the extent of
collateral consequences of wrongdoing, the adequacy of remedies, and the
adequacy of prosecutions of individuals. 71 The commentary makes clear that
these factors are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and their use is also a
matter of discretion.72
A number of the factors to be considered are the subject of further policy.
Special provision is made for activities of a multinational corporation, which
"necessarily intersects with federal economic, tax, and criminal law
enforcement policies."73 The pervasiveness of wrongdoing serves as a
prosecutorial trigger in effect to deploy prosecution as a means of resocializing the corporation to better conduct. Thus, the PBO instructs to
prosecute even minor misconduct where it indicates a corporate culture that
prosecutors deem worthy of changing.74 In addition, the PBO adheres to the
principle that "a corporation, like a natural person, is expected to learn from
its mistakes."75 Cooperation also has value as a mitigating factor.76 But the
nature of cooperation is quite specific-the corporation must identify afl
individuals tainted with misconduct and provide all facts "relating to" that
69. Id. § §9-28.210 ("Provable individual culpability should be pursued, particularly if it
relates to high-level corporate officers, even in the face of an offer of a corporate guilty plea or
some other disposition of the charges against the corporation, including a deferred prosecution
or non-prosecution agreement, or a civil resolution."). Yet the commentary suggests a
preference for sweeping individual and entity liability together where possible, providing an
expansive interpretation of legal rules for imputing individual conduct on corporate actors. Id.

§ 9-28.210(B).
70. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.300.
71. Id. Note the effect of the factors on building incentive structures to develop and
implement compliance programs satisfactory to the federal prosecution officials and to sacrifice
legally protected rights to contest accusation by rewarding confession and disclosure over the

more traditional adversarial rights of prosecutorial actions, individual or enterprise. Id. § 928.300(B). The result is a weakening of the traditional structures of conventional relations
between the state and its subjects, while increasing the efficiency of mechanics of enforcement

of behavior norms. See id.
72. Id. § 9-28.300(B).
73. Id. § 9-28.400. The comment advises prosecutors to be cognizant of jurisdictional and
prosecution policies of other federal agencies. Id. § 9-28.400(B).
74. Id. § 9-28.500.
75. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.600(B).
76. Id. § 9-28.700. The PBO notes that the "failure to cooperate, in and of itself, does not
support or require the filing of charges with respect to a corporation any more than with respect

to an individual." Id.
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misconduct.77 The PBO is itself bound by higher law to the extent its
provisions are unavoidable, and they appear to be unavoidable in clashes
between aggressive efforts to obtain cooperation and the rights of criminal
defendants under the U.S. legal system's core principles. Provision is thus
made for respect of attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product
protection.78 But the position is defensive and takes some umbrage at the
extensive criticism of its aggressive stance, throwing up its assessment of the
importance of its own mandate against the purported efforts of enterprises
and individuals to hide behind the law to avoid punishment for misconduct.79
This is hardly reassuring, but it evidences the extent to which the
government apparatus privileges its own interests in the objective of seeking
80
out and punishing wrongdoing-as it sees it.
This tension is also clear in
the PBO's consideration of the way in which cooperation is valued in
exercising prosecutorial discretion. 81 Here, the PBO walks a fine line
between pushing hard for information and disclosure and recognition of, to
the narrowest extent consistent with law, respect for corporate and
individual rights within an adversarial system. One of the most interesting
aspects of this section of the PBO is the way that it highlights the great
tension between the mechanics and cultures of the modern administrative
state-grounded in management and compliance-and the old cultures of
common-law-based liberal democracy, grounded in the prerogatives of
individuals and bodies corporate against the sovereign into which the
individual is not entirely subsumed.82
But just as disclosure, compliance, and cooperation can balance in favor of
exercising prosecutorial discretion against litigation and toward D/NPA
regimes, obstruction can have the opposite effect.83 "Examples of such
conduct could include: inappropriate directions to employees or their
counsel, such as directions not to be truthful or to conceal relevant facts;
making representations or submissions that contain misleading assertions or
material omissions; and incomplete or delayed production of records."84
There is irony here. While the government expects the corporation to fully
disclose all facts related to an investigation, it also expects the corporation's
silence with respect to its communication with the government, at least to
77. Id. "The extent of the cooperation credit earned will depend on all the various factors that
have traditionally applied in making this assessment (e.g., the timeliness of the cooperation, the
diligence, thoroughness and speed of the internal investigation, and the proactive nature of the

cooperation)." Id.
78. Id. § 9-28.710.
79. Id.
80. The tension is especially evident in mediating prosecutorial conduct concerning waivers of
attorney client privilege or work product protections. See id. § 9-28.750.
81. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.720.
82. See Larry Cata Backer, Reifying Law - Government, Law and the Rule of Law in Governance
Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 521 (2008) (discussing in more theoretical terms).
83. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.730.
84. Id.
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the extent that such disclosure can be tied to the misconduct of others.85
Moreover, offers of cooperation are not to be confused with immunity.
Cooperation is a factor in decisions about the exercise of administrative
discretion; it is not a guarantee of corporate escape from liability.86
87
The PBO spends some time describing corporate compliance programs.
Though insufficient in its own right to justify not charging a corporation for
criminal conduct, the "Department encourages such corporate self-policing,
including voluntary disclosures to the government of any problems that a
corporation discovers on its own."ss And, citing a number of judicial
opinions to this effect, even if a corporate compliance program was
established to prevent the criminal conduct in question, the compliance
program alone is insufficient to avoid prosecution.89 The critical factors in
giving credit for compliance programs-or put another way, the principal
character of corporate compliance programs for which PBO provides an
incentive-"are whether the program is adequately designed for maximum
effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees and
whether corporate management is enforcing the program or is tacitly
encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve
business objectives."90 The ability of the compliance program to ferret out
wrongdoing in a timely manner is an important consideration.91 The object
is to distinguish what the PBO characterizes as "paper programs" from
effective ones, with reference not merely to construction but to staffing and
founding as well.92 Tied to corporate compliance programs is the obligation
of voluntary disclosure. Discretion is grounded in effect on corporate
compliance programs, the results of which are routinely transmitted to the
appropriate state agencies for review and action. 93 This aligns with
programs of other administrative agencies that have already constructed
formal programs of "self-reporting coupled with remediation and additional
criteria." 9 4 Yet even in the absence of formal, voluntary disclosure programs,
ad hoc voluntary disclosure counts for something, as long as it is timely.95 A
85. Id. ("for example, where the disclosure of such information could lead to flight by
individual subjects, destruction of evidence, or dissipation or concealment of assets.").
86. Id. § 9-28.740.
87. Id. § 9-28.800.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 9-28.800(B).
90. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.800(B).Although there is no formula, the PBO
specifies a number of factors, including "the comprehensiveness of the compliance program; the
extent and pervasiveness of the criminal misconduct; the number and level of the corporate
employees involved; the seriousness, duration, and frequency of the misconduct; and any
remedial actions taken by the corporation, including, for example, disciplinary action against

past violators uncovered by the prior compliance program, and revisions to corporate
compliance programs in light of lessons learned." Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 9-28.900.
Id.

95. Id.
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similar approach applies to weighing the efforts of corporations to provide
restitution or otherwise remediate wrongdoing.96 The remediation must be
meaningful and may include disciplining individual wrongdoers, making
restitution, and reforming compliance mechanisms. 97 These efforts touch
on the collateral consequences of wrongdoing9-the extent of which a
prosecutor may weigh in exercising discretion with respect to charging a
crime or resolving a criminal case. 99 D/NPAs may be considered in this
context "where the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction for
innocent third parties would be significant, ...
with conditions designed,
among other things, to promote compliance with applicable law and to
prevent recidivism."oo And that brings the PBO to the heart of its
regulatory sword-the power to enter into plea agreements or D/NPAs.oI
The PBO provides a framework for determining the terms of such
agreements or pleas.102 Plea agreements ought to include a conscious
admission of guilt and further the core principles of punishment, deterrence,
and rehabilitation.03
The PBO provides the basis for structuring pleas and D/NPAs in the
context of corruption investigations against enterprises. These guidelines
are set out in an FCPA Enforcement Pilot Project announced as part of the
Department of Justice's Fraud Section Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement Plan and Guidance.04 It starts by declaring bribery to pose "a
serious systemic criminal problem across the globe [which] harms those who
play by the rules, siphons money from communities, and undermines the
rule of law."105 To the ends of reducing this threat, the FCPA Enforcement
Plan and Guidance specifies a three-step project for advancing its strategy of
combatting corruption through bribery.06 First, the government committed
to intensifying its investigative and prosecutorial efforts against bribery. 07
Second, the government committed to engaging in multilateral efforts to
96. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.1000(A) ("A prosecutor may also consider other
remedial actions, such as improving an existing compliance program or disciplining
wrongdoers, in determining whether to charge the corporation and how to resolve corporate
criminal cases.").
97. Id. § 9-28.1000(B).
98. Id. ("Therefore, in evaluating the relevance of collateral consequences, various factors
already discussed, such as the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct and the adequacy of the
corporation's compliance programs.
99. Id. § 9-28.1100(A).
100. Id. § 9-28.1100(B).
101. Id. § 9-28.1500.
102. Id.
103. JusTICE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.1500.
104. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION'S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE (2016) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/

file/838386/download.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id.
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combat bribery.os The government bragged that "[t]he fruits of this
increased international cooperation can be seen in the prosecutions of both
individuals and corporations, in cases involving Archer Daniels Midland,
Alcoa, Alstom, Dallas Airmotive, Hewlett-Packard, IAP, Marubeni, Vadim
Mikerin, Parker Drilling, PetroTiger, Total, and VimpelCom, among many
others."109
The most important part of the FCPA Enforcement Plan and Guidance
was its third step: the development of a pilot program to "promote greater
accountability for individuals and companies that engage in corporate crime
by motivating companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related
misconduct, fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, ... and remediate flaws
in their controls and compliance programs."iio The object was to transform
a number of key factors for determining the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion under the Justice Manual PBO"' into a formal program that
produces "credit" that will "affect the type of disposition, the reduction in
fine, or the determination of the need for a monitor."112 The pilot program
3
was not meant to supplant the PBO and voluntary disclosure."
This Guidance, by contrast, sets forth the circumstances in which an
organization can receive additional credit in FCPA matters, above and
beyond any fine reduction provided for under the Sentencing
Guidelines, and the manner in which that additional credit should be
determined, whether it be in the type of disposition, the extent of
reduction in fine, or the determination of the need for a monitor."4
The three parts of the requirements for compliance with the FCPA pilot
program are voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely and
appropriate remediation."5 Voluntary self-disclosure does not include
legally mandated disclosure.ii6 In order to qualify, the disclosure must occur
before an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; the
disclosure must be made within a reasonably prompt time after becoming
aware of the offense (the company is burdened with proof of timeliness); and
the company must disclose all known relevant facts, including all relevant
facts about individuals involved in the wrongdoing." 7 To meet the
cooperation requirements, in addition to the cooperation standards under
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. JUSTICE MANLAL, supra note 29, § 9-28.300.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 104 at 25, (referencing the PBO and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines as the basis of the guidance in the Pilot Program).
113. Id. ("Nothing in the Guidance is intended to suggest that the government can require
business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, or remediate. Companies remain
free to reject these options and forego the credit available under the pilot program.").
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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the PBO, the cooperating entity must agree to a fairly comprehensive set of
cooperating obligations.1I 8 These include that the company: (1) make timely
and complete disclosure; (2) cooperate proactively;"19 (3) preserve, collect,
and disclose all relevant documents; (4) disclose timely updates of internal
investigations; (5) "[w]here requested, de-confliction of an internal
investigation with the government investigation";120 (6) provide all relevant
facts relevant to potential criminal liability by third party companies; (7)
make individuals available for interviews by government officials; (8) disclose
all relevant facts gathered during independent investigations; (9)disclose
overseas documents and the locations where found and who found them;
(10) facilitate the third party production of documents; and (11) where
requested, provide translation of non-English language documents.121
Assessment of the value of cooperation is undertaken on a case by case
basis.122 Lastly, the remediation requirement poses some challenges.23 To
evaluate remediation, it is first necessary to determine whether the company
is eligible for cooperation credit.124 Beyond that, the company will have to
evidence a number of requirements. It must evidence an effective
compliance program.125 The company must also demonstrate appropriate
discipline of employees and any additional steps that "demonstrate
recognition of the seriousness of the corporation's misconduct, acceptance
of responsibility for it, and the implementation of measures to reduce the
'
risk of repetition of such misconduct."126
The FCPA Enforcement Plan and Guidance provides substantial incentives
for compliance. Companies receive substantial partial credit for full
cooperation and appropriate remediation without voluntary selfdisclosure.127 Much more credit is given for full cooperation, voluntary selfdisclosure, and remediation. If a criminal resolution is warranted, then the
company may receive up to a fifty percent reduction off of the bottom end of
118. Id.

119. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,supra note 104 ("That is, the company must disclose facts that are
relevant to the investigation, even when not specifically asked to do so, and must identify
opportunities for the government to obtain relevant evidence not in the company's possession
and not otherwise known to the government").
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("Fraud Section should assess the scope, quantity, quality, and timing of cooperation
based on the circumstances of each case when assessing how to evaluate a company's

cooperation under this pilot.").
123. Id.
124. Id.

125. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 104. An effective compliance program evidences an
established "culture of compliance," the dedication of adequate resources to compliance,
adequate personnel, "the independence of the compliance function," the use of effective risk
assessment, adequate promotion and compensation for compliance employees, appropriate
auditing of the compliance function, and adequate internal reporting structures. Id.
126. Id.

127. Id. ("at most a

25

% reduction off the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range").
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the Sentencing Guidelines, and avoid the appointment of a monitor.128 But
the Fraud Division can also consider a declination of prosecution.129 The
decision is subject to its own calculus: "this pilot program is intended to
encourage companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the
prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement."130 As of June 29,
the Department of Justice had agreed to declinations against seven
3
companies under the pilot program.' '
In this approach one can discern a new form of national regulatory power.
The focus is not on setting standards or on the construction of rules, but on
the control of the exercise of administrative discretion around which the
parameters of corporate behavior may be managed. This is a very powerful
sword, indeed. It moves the focus of regulatory control of corruption from
the construction of legal standards to the mechanics of compliance. And the
approach centers the investigative and charging authority of prosecutors as
the source of governmental power to produce and manage change. It is new
in the sense of detaching rule making either from direct action by the
legislature, or from formal rule making by administrative agencies within
their legislative mandate. It is also new in the sense of the contingency of
the approach. The approach focuses on the management of executive
discretion, but it is designed as a set of consequences for choices made by the
"objects" of regulation.
That contingent character of the approach is perhaps its most interesting
feature. The obligations built around these new regulatory approaches are
not mandatory. Corporations have the power to reject the incentives toward
leniency written into the guidance. Alternatively, they can choose to change
their behavior, anticipating that at some point their enterprises will likely be
the target of a complaint and an investigation. Either way, the state uses its
power over the management of criminal behavior to exercise oversight. And
in both cases, it remains the obligation of the state to define the normative
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

131. See Letter from the Dep't of Justice to K&L Gates, regarding Nortek, Inc. (June 3, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865406/download; Letter from the Dep't of Justice
to Ropes & Gray LLP, regarding Akamai Technologies, Inc. (June 6, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865411/download; Letter from the Dep't of Justice to
'WilmerHale, regarding Johnson Controls, Inc. (June 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/

criminal -fraud/file/874566/download; Letter from the Dep't of Justice to Weil, Gotchal &
Manges LLP, regarding HMT LLC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
file/899116/download; Letter from the Dep't of Justice to Locke Lord LLP, regarding NCH
Corp. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/8991 21/download; Letter
from the Dep't of Justice to Steptoe &Johnson LLP, regarding Linde North America Inc.,
(June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/974516/download; Letter from the

Dep't of Justice to Paul Hastings LLP, regarding CDM Smith Inc. (June 21, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,

Declinations, JUSTICE.GOV,

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot-program/

declinations (last updated Aug. 23, 2018).
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2019]

CHINESE STRATEGIES TO COMBAT CORPORATE CORRUPTION

19

standards around which prosecutorial power is asserted. In the context of
corruption, those standards tend to be statutory, though they are informed
by custom and practice. Yet, it must be emphasized that the decision to
invest more instrumentally in the use of prosecutorial guidance systemsand the institutionalization of discretionary decision making-also
challenges the legislative authority of state actors in substantial ways. In the
United States, it presents a challenge to the authority of states, rather than of
the federal government, to exercise authority over the regulation of
corporations and corporate governance. It is true enough that federal
legislative authority, in the form of the securities laws, has made substantial
inroads. But the use of federal prosecutorial authority represents an effort
by the executive authority to undermine the coherence of the legislative
authority of states.
Nevertheless, this approach to behavior management also tends to
comport with emerging sensibilities in regulatory governance. 132 From a
normative standpoint, the approach of the Department of Justice-and to
some extent that of the Brazilian and U.K. variations-also comports with
the approaches to the organization of governance regimes around issues of
the corporate social responsibilities, including human rights responsibilities,
of business and the role of the state in facilitating the conformity of business
with those responsibilities. 133 For business, there is a focus on cooperation,
compliance, disclosure, and remediation in ways that are meant to establish
partnerships between the state and business.

III. The Second Sword: The Role of Sovereign Investors
Through the Norwegian Model and its Global Implications
The programs of regulation that flow from the use of institutionalized
rules for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion set up a baseline of
compliance, reporting, and remediation that serves the core objectives of
policing and combatting corruption. But, the efforts of the state through its
132. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Theorizing Regulatory Governance Within Its Ecology: The
RES. NETWORK, https://

Structure of Management in an Age of Globalization, THE Soc. Sci.

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2783018 (Last revised Dec. 16, 2016). At its core,
it speaks to the management of people and human activity, and the means through which those

can be implemented for specific purposes grounded in specific ideologies.

Regulatory

governance is also intimately tied to projects of good governance, at least in the sense that both
discourses focus on a similar palette of means and ends. Yet, at the same time it is meant to

embody a set of premises about the efficiency of managing behaviors and compelling
compliance with authority. It is a form through which public government can be expressed
expanding the administrative possibilities of democratic government, and the essence of private

governance regimes. Id.
133. See Office of High Comm'r of Human Rights, Guiding principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect,Respect, and Remedy Framework" U.N. Doc. HR/
PUB/ 11/04 (2011). See generally Larry Cata Backer, Moving Forwardthe UN Guiding Principles
for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the

Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All, 38

FORDHAM INT'L LJ.

457 (2015).
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mechanics of prosecution have been augmented by the role of the state in
markets. The most effective form of this intervention has been through the
activities of sovereign wealth funds to manage the conduct of operating
enterprises by limiting access to their capital and by exercising shareholder
power in the companies in which they invest. This section considers how
the Norwegian Pension Fund Global (NPFG), Norway's sovereign wealth
fund, has institutionalized a markets-based program that focuses on
134
corporate anti-corruption efforts.
The NPFG was created by statute in the Government Pension Fund Act
which provides that the NPFG is ultimately administered by the Ministry of
Finance. 13 The Ministry of Finance has authority to issue guidelines for the
management of the NPFG.136 Through its guidelines, the Ministry of
Finance has delegated investment authority to the Norges Bank and its
instrumentalities. 37 The Ministry of Finance has also imposed a set of
investment objectives to which the Norges Bank must adhere.138 The
Norges Bank is to seek the highest possible returns; it is to avoid investing in
companies excluded from the investment universe, from which the Bank may
choose the enterprise in which to invest; and it is required to exercise
responsible management. 39 Responsible management is specifically defined
with reference to compliance with Norwegian and international standards.140
These include strong principles against corruption in the investment by the
NPFG that are built into the substantive principles of the standards to be
14
applied in making investment decisions.
The Norges Bank is given authority to make decisions about the exclusion
or observation of companies in accordance with the Guidelines for
134. For more detailed discussion of the NPFG and its operation, see Larry Cata Backer,
Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of Law Building: The Norzvegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 A. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2013); Larry Cata Backer,
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwvegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425 (2010).
135. Bestemmelser om forvaltningen av States pensjonsfond, nr. 123.
136. See Mandat for forvaltningen av Statens pensjonsfond utland, 8. Nov. 2010, nr. 1414.
137. Id. at ch. 7 (establishing the relationship between the Norges Bank and the Ministry of
Finance).
138. Id. § 1-3.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 2-2. Responsible management principles include: "(1) The Bank shall establish a
broad set of principles for the responsible management of the investment portfolio. (2) In
designing the principles pursuant to the first paragraph, the Bank shall emphasise the long-term
horizon for the management of the investment portfolio and that the investment portfolio shall
be broadly diversified across the markets included in the investment universe. (3) The
principles shall be based on the considerations of good corporate governance and
environmental and social conditions in the investment management, in accordance with
internationally recognised principles and standards such as the UN Global Compact, the
OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance and the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises."

141. Id. § 2-2(1).
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observation and exclusion from the NPFG.142 The Guidelines for
Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global (the
Guidelines) 43 "apply to the work of the Council on Ethics for the
Government Pension Fund Global (the Council) and Norges Bank (the
Bank) on the observation and exclusion of companies from the portfolio of
the [NPFG]."'44 "The [Ethics] Council consists of five members appointed
by the Ministry of Finance after receiving a nomination from the [Norges]
Bank."145 The role of the Ethics Council is to evaluate whether specific
NPFG investments are consistent with the Ethics Guidelines.146 The Ethics
Council may, after investigation, recommend to the Norges Bank that a
company be excluded from the NPFG investment universe, that the
company be placed under observation, or that no action be taken.47 The
recommendation is not mandatory, and the ultimate decision is vested in the
NPFG administrator, the Norges Bank.148
There are differences between determinations to exclude a company and
determinations to put a company under observation.y 9 An excluded
company may not be the subject of NPFG investment.150 Once a company
is excluded, the connection between it and the NPFG is severed. The
NPFG will not invest in the excluded company or any of its related
entities.' 5' The exclusion decision is publicized,152 and may affect the
company's reputation and access to capital. In a sense, exclusion negatively
impacts the social credit of the excluded company. 5 3 The length of the
exclusion will vary. 154 An excluded company may seek to have the exclusion
lifted.55 To that end, it must seek action from the Ethics Council and the
142. Id. § 2-5.
143. See GOV'T ADMIN.

SERV. OF NORWAY, GUIDELINES FOR OBSERVATION AND EXCLUSION

FROM THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL (2014)

https://www.regjeringen.no/content

assets/7c9a364d2d1c474f8220965065695a4a/guidelines observation exclusion2016.pdf.
[hereinafter GUIDELINES].
144. Id. §1(1).
145. Id. §4(1).
146. Id. §5.
147. Id. §5(3).
148. Id. §6(1).

149. GUIDELINES, supra note 143, §6(3).
150. Id. §2(1).
151. Id.

152. Id. §8(1).
153. Social credit is understood here in its more general sense as ranking and reputation. But it
can also be understood in its more formal sense as the ratings, subject to incentive and penalty
currently being developed in China. See Rogier Creemers, Planning Outline for the Construction
of a Social Credit System (2014-2020), (Last updated on April 25, 2015), https://chinacopyright
andmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-socialcredit-system-2014-2020/.
154. Procedures for the Reinclusion of Companies, THE GOV'T PENSION FUND GLOBAL OF
NORWAY, https://etikkradet.no/procedures-for-the-reinclusion-of-companies/
(last visited Oct.
7, 2018).
155. Id.
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Norges Bank.156 That usually requires a showing that the wrongdoing has
been corrected and that systems are in place to better ensure that such
157
wrongdoing will not be repeated.
In contrast to exclusion, observation parallels the PBO process in some
ways. It is grounded on the idea that cooperation, disclosure, remediation,
and reform is, in the long run, better for society and the performance of the
enterprise.
Being placed under observation by the Council on Ethics signals that a
company has come very close to exclusion from the GPFG. The
Council will keep a watchful eye on developments in the company's
operations. Should any new violations of ethical norms be uncovered,
or the company fails to implement effective measures to reduce the
future risk of non-compliance, the condition for recommending its
exclusion from the GPFG may be met. 58
The burden remains on the company to substantiate compliance, including
remediation and the implementation of a compliance system that targets
wrongdoing.59 Observation permits a measure of supervision by the NPFG.
In addition, the NPFG uses its staff to investigate compliance independently
and receives reports from the company. 60 Of course, observation is purely
voluntary, in the way that compliance with the requirements of the PBO are
voluntary.61 But refusals of cooperation can lead to decisions to divest and
drop a company from the investment universe of the NPFG.62 This
divestment is publicized and might have effects on the access of the company
to financial markets.63 It might also open the company, or contribute, to
investigation by governmental regulators depending on the nature of the
wrongdoing.
The substantive principles that guide the decisions of the Ethics Council
and Norges Bank on exclusion and observation are set out in the Guidelines.
They are of two distinct kinds. The first consists of product based grounds
for exclusion or observation.64 The other consists of specified conduct
based grounds for exclusion or observation.65 Among these, "[c]ompanies
156. Id.

157. Id. ("Excluded companies are encouraged to inform the Council of matters that may cause
their exclusion to be revoked").
158.

COUNCIL ON

ETHICS FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOV'T PENSION FUND

GLOBAL, ANNUAL

13 (2016), https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/etikkradet3/files/2017/03/Etikkraadet-an
nualreport_2016_web.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2016].
159. Id. ("The Council takes the position that it is up to the company to substantiate that it is
working systematically to prevent violations which may lead to exclusion from the fund.").
160. Id.
161. SeeJUSTICE MANUAL,supra note 29.
162. Id.
163. Id.
REPORT

164. GUIDELINES, supra note 143, §2 (certain weapons, coal use, and tobacco products, for
example.).
165. Id. §3.
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may be put under observation or be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk
that the company contributes to or is responsible for . . . gross
'
corruption."166
Corruption is understood to include both active and passive
corruption.16 7 More importantly, the normative standards for corruption are
drawn from both national and international sources, which are made a key
element of assessment of anti-corruption efforts.168 The NPFG also relies
on a number of soft law guidelines to help refine its approach to the
standards it would use to judge anti-corruption efforts in light of corruption
wrongdoing.169
The NPFG has not traditionally focused on corruption, even though it
was one of the categories of misconduct of sufficient severity to support a
determination of divestment and exclusion for the NPFG investment
universe. Altogether by 2016, nine cases had been considered, the majority
of them since 2015.170 Indeed, by 2015, the Ethics Council could report that
"the criterion we have devoted the most resources to this year is corruption.
This is primarily a consequence of the sectoral studies we have
performed.' 171 The Ethics Council noted an increased focus on corruption
as an important element in its monitoring since 2013. "Since 2013, the
Council on Ethics has not only assessed companies shown by news
monitoring to have comprehensive corruption accusations levelled at them,
but has also specifically reviewed companies in countries and sectors where
international rankings show that the risk of corruption is presumed to be
particularly high."172 Interestingly, there is also reliance on the U.S. Justice
and Securities and Exchange Commission's Resource Guide to the U.S.
166. Id. §3(e).

167.

ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 158, at 19.
168. Id. at 23 (The Report identifies a number of national and international regulatory

frameworks, including the Foreign Corruption Prevention Act (FCPA) and the UK Bribery Act,
as well as The United Nations Global Compact (The Ten Principles), the Asia-Pacific
Economic Council (Anti -Corruption Code of Conduct for Business), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules on Combating Corruption), the World Bank (Integrity
Compliance Guidelines), and The World Economic Forum (Partnering Against CorruptionPrinciples for Countering Bribery).
169. Id.; see also, TRACK, http://www.track.unodc.org/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Oct. 3,
2018); A Guide for Anti-Corruption Risk Assessment, U.N.

GLOBAL

COMPACT,

https://

www.unglobalcompact.org/library/41 1(last visited Oct. 3, 2018); Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance, OECD (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org-

investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/44884389.pdf.
170. See Gross Corruption, THE COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE Gov'T PENSION FUND
https://etikkradet.no/recommendations/gross-corruption/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2018),
for a listing of the cases with links to original sources.
171. ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 158, at 5.
GLOBAL,

172.

THE COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE NORWEGIAN

GoV'T PENSION FUND

GLOBAL,

2015, at 24, available at https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/etikkradet3/files/
2017/02/Etikkraadet AR 2015_web-1.pdf; id. at 11 (Companies are "the building and

ANNUAL REPORT

construction, defence [sic], and telecommunications industries as well as the oil and gas
sector.").
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,173 and similar guides prepared for
174
compliance under the criminal provisions of U.K. law.
In considering corruption as a basis for sanction (observation or
exclusion), the NPFG considers both current behavior and future risk of
wrongdoing. Future risk is assessed on the basis of the cooperation of the
company to the Ethics Council's investigation, and initial remediation
efforts. 175 In corruption matters the important signal from the company is
that it acknowledges wrongdoing and its willingness "both internally and
externally ... to change course."176 The NPFG also looks to the vitality of
anti-corruption compliance systems and programs.7 To assess the value of
the company compliance system the NPFG looks to international
standards,'78 and looks to manifestations of company policies and programs
in appropriately drafted and implemented Codes of Conduct, the
manifestations of "tones at the top" (expressions from senior managers of the
importance of anti-corruption principles), and proof of the effectiveness of
the program-manifested by "specific examples of former employeesirrespective of position or role-being sanctioned for non-compliance, as
evidence that the same rules apply to everyone.' 79 For these to satisfy the
Council, the company must be willing to engage in dialogue with the
Council of Ethics and to demonstrate a willingness to modify compliance to
assure the NPFG that compliance systems are better able to assure against
future risk of corruption wrongdoing.80 The NPFG can develop conditions
and produce conditions to guide the company from observation to full
approval status. 18' NPFG has also suggested programs of integrity due
173. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
ACT (2012), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf; see also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A MANUAL FOR
PRACTICE

MANAGING

A RESPONSIBLE

BUSINESS

ENTERPRISE

IN

EMERGING MARKET ECONOMICS

(2004), available at https://www.trade.gov/goodgovernance/adobe/bem-manual.pdf.
174. See U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010 -guidance.pdf.
175. ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 158, at 20 ("First and foremost, the Council attaches
importance to the way in which the company responds to the corruption allegations and

whether individuals who knew or should have known what was going on are removed from their
positions.").
176. Id.

177. Id. ("the Council on Ethics places consider-able emphasis on the anti -corruption
procedures a company has established and how these are in fact implemented. These measures
are brought together in the company's anti-corruption programme [sic], which normally
accounts for an important element of its overall internal control system").

178. Id.
179. Id. at 21.
180. Id. ("In several companies with which the Council has communicated, face-to-face training
is also given to agents and important third parties.").

181. ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 158, at 21 ("Based on the dialogue that the Council has
had with certain companies, an absolute precondition for a good educational programme [sic] is
that the company evaluates the extent to which employees feel that the training they have been
given enables them to handle the situations they may encounter.").
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diligence with company engagement with third parties including cross
border procedures for reporting noncompliance (including anonymous
employee reporting), measures for registering and investigating these
reports, and developing steps for applying discipline.182
The NPFG has also developed principles for the organization of anticorruption efforts within the institutional structures of companies. In ways
that also echo the PBO and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the
NPFG explained that
it is considered best practice for multinational companies of a certain
size to have an independent compliance department, which is
responsible for all regions and divisions, and which has sufficient
resources and an adequate budget. The head of this department (the
Chief Compliance Officer or equivalent) reports to group management
and the board. This compliance function is normally responsible for
the overlapping compliance efforts relating to corruption and
competition law issues, and there is normally a close collaboration and
exchange of information between the Compliance Department and
those responsible for other governing bodies. In order for corruption
prevention to be effective, the allocation of roles and responsibilities in
the Compliance Department should be determined by the Chief
Compliance Officer.183
Critical to assessment is voluntary disclosure to supplement the independent
assessment of the Ethics Council and its Secretariat. In the absence of
substantiation, the NPFG might find it easier to conclude that the risk of
future corruption has not been reduced.84
The assessment and review of the NPFG is usually triggered by ongoing
corruption investigationsundertaken by governments. 8 5 In that respect, there
is a de facto connection between the efforts of governments to punish
corruption, and the efforts of sovereign investors, like NPFG, to use their
private investor power to drive anti-corruption efforts, including
remediation and reform of compliance systems. But there is no coordination.
The two swords exist, but they are wielded by different parties with different
jurisdictions, whose connection is grounded in a convergence of global
norms around anti-corruption measures and remediation expected to
companies, and more importantly around compliance efforts as part of
corporate governance regimes. Indeed, there is little by way of connection
between state anti-corruption regimes, even those based on an
institutionalized prosecutor discretion management system, much less
between those and the sovereign investors who have significant influence in
global markets-especially the NPFG and its Chinese counterparts.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 7.
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The arc of NPFG anti-corruption action is nicely illustrated by an early
investigation against the German multinational corporation Siemens AG.186
In 2007, the Council on Ethics recommended to exclude the German
company Siemens AG due to severe and systematic corruption. 1 7 The
Council noted that the "Siemens case is very serious with regard to the
numerous and repeated instances of corruption over many years, the large
sums involved, and the insecurity associated with the company's
countermeasures."Iss The investigation was triggered well after numerous
proceedings had been initiated by governments against Siemens and its
officials for bribery and other related offences. It was no surprise, then, that
central to the Ethics Council's investigation were court documents,
including final and enforceable judgments, along with the products of
administrative proceedings in a number of jurisdictions.189 These cases
involved the governments of Germany, Norway, Singapore, and Italy.190
Additional sources of information, and standards against which misconduct
could be judged, included some prominent non-governmental organizations
and an investigation commenced by the U.S. Department of Justice.' 91
Siemens responded to the investigations by initiating projects of cooperation
and compliance system building.192
The cooperation was not limited to the states where investigations were
located but also important international organizations, including the
Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation.93 Those
efforts served as the foundation of Siemen's response to NPFG actioneffectively that it should receive credit for its cooperation, voluntary
disclosures, and changes in compliance regimes. 194 In 2007, that response
was insufficient for the Ethics Council, which recommended exclusion. 195
Rejecting this assessment, the Ministry of Finance decided to place the
company under observation.196 The Ethics Council persisted by a letter the
3rd of September 2008 in which it noted the substantial compliance efforts
as well as remediation initiatives undertaken, but still found them
insufficient in response to a request by the Finance Ministry to reconsider its
186. See, e.g.,

SIEMENS

AG, https://www.siemens.com/global/en/home.html (last visited Sept.

24, 2018), for more information on the company.
187. See

COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOV'T PENSION FUND

RECOMMENDATION

GLOBAL,

13 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/

Recommendation-on-Siemens-2007.pdf [hereinafter
188. Id. at 2.

RECOMMENDATION].

189. Id. at 5.
190. Id. at 6 13.
191. Id. at 13.
192. Id. at 16.
193. Id. at 14 16.
194. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 187, at 16 17.
195. Id. at 20.
196. See Siemens AG, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GoV'T PENSION FUND
3, 2017), available at https://etikkradet.no/siemens-ag-english/.
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recommendation in light of additional information.197 As part of the
observation regime imposed by the Ministry of Finance, the "Council on
Ethics and Norges Bank are required to keep Siemens under special
observation during this period and report annually to the Ministry of
Finance on developments in the company."198 In June 2012, the Council on
Ethics recommended to the Ministry of Finance that Siemens be removed
from the observation list in light of evidence of reform and institutionally
firmer compliance.99 It reviewed the post-2008 response of Siemens to
instances of corruption (more specifically in the operations in Kuwait and
other places), the robustness of the compliance system, and disclosure and
response. 200 The connection between the effects of sovereign investing
relationships on compliance and monitoring and its informal connection to
national corruption efforts is clear.
Two recent cases from the NPFG suggest both the possibilities for good
anti-corruption regimes offered by coordination among government and
sovereign investors, and the challenges of the current uncoordinated system.
The first involved a Chinese company, ZTE Corporation (ZTE Corp.).201
The second involved a Brazilian state enterprise, Petrobras.202 The section
ends with a suggestion about the direction and importance of institutional
trends.
A. ZTE CORP.203
On January 7, 2016, the Norges Bank decided to exclude the Chinese
company, ZTE Corporation, one of the world's five largest producers of
telecommunications equipment and network solutions, from the investment
197. See COUNCIL

ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND

GLOBAL, THE COUNCIL ON

AG (Sept. 3, 2017), available at http://
etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Svarbrev-til-FinansdepartementetENG-2008.pdf.
ETHICS RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE SIEMENS

198. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND
TO

REMOVE

PENSION

SIEMENS

AG

FUND GLOBAL

FROM

THE WATCH LIST

OF THE

GLOBAL, RECOMMENDATION
NORWEGIAN

GOVERNMENT

1 (June 15, 2012), available at http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/

Siemens-2012_eng.pdf.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 2 6.
201. COUNCIL ON

ETHICS FOR THE GoV'T PENSION FUND

GLOBAL, THE COUNCIL ON

(June 24, 2015), available at http://
etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/ENG-TilroC3 %A5dning-ZTE-24.-juni-2015 -ENGELSKamended-Nov.-2016.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE].
202. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GoV'T PENSION FUND GLOBAL, RECOMMENDATION
ETHICS RECOMMENDATION To EXCLUDE ZTE CORP.
0

TO PUT

A COMPANY

PETROLEO BRASILEIRO

IN THE GOV'T PENSION

FUND

GLOBAL UNDER OBSERVATION:

SA (Dec. 21, 2015), available at http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/

Recommendation-Petrobras-21 -December-2015.pdf.
203. See Larry Cata Backer, Corruption and Investment Chinese Company ZTE Corp. Excluded
from Norway Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Universe, L. AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan.7,
2016, 12:18 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/corruption-and-investmentchinese.html.
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universe of the GPFG.204 The company is excluded based on an assessment
of the risk of severe corruption and is grounded in a Council on Ethics
Recommendation of June 25, 2015.205 The recommendation reflects the
growing importance of corruption in investment decisions. But it may also
suggest a distinction in treatment between European companies which in the
past have been subject to observation, and the use of shareholder power by
the Norwegian soverign wealth fund (SW)
and this company for which
divestment appeared to be the better option.06
ZTE Corporation is a privately-operated Chinese state-owned enterprise
with substantial private investment in its securities.207 At least as a formal
matter, ZTE is deeply embedded in transnational soft law standards for
business conduct. It's website notes that:
In February, 2009, ZTE Corporation has formally become a member of
the United Nations Global Compact. ZTE will take this as a new
starting pointing to bring the Global Compact and its Ten Principles
into its corporate culture and business concept to make great effort to
promote the harmonious development among economy, environment
and society, thus committing itself to become the paragon of the Global
Corporate Citizenship. . . .ZTE's CSR strategy is to pro-actively
develop, implement and improve CSR compliance throughout ZTE
and its supply chain based on industry best practices, continuous
learning and improvement efforts. Its objective is to develop into a
global CSR leader long-term.20s
As typical for Chinese corporations, corportate social responsibility (CSR)
efforts are built around charity and societal programs that work in parallel
with state policy for economic, social, and cultural development.209 "Active
in community programs, ZTE participated in relief efforts related to the
2004 tsunami in Indonesia, the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China, and the

204.

RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note

201.

205. Id.
206. See Decision on Exclusion of Company from Government Pension Fund Global, NORGES BANK
INV.MGMT. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/news-list/2016/decision-onexclusion-of-company- from-the-government-pension-fund-global/.
207.

RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE,

supra note 201.

208. See About ZTE: Responsibility, ZTE (2016), http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/about/
corporate-citizenship/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
209. See Larry Cata Backer, China's Corporate Social Responsibility with National Characteristics:
Coherence and Dissonance with the Global Business and Human Rights Project, THE BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 530 58 (ena Martin &
Karen E. Bravo, eds., Cambridge University Press 2016); Larry Cata Backer, Realizing SocioEconomic Rights Under Emerging Global Regulatory Frameworks: The Potential Impact of
Privatization and the role of Companies in China and India, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 615
(2013).
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2010 earthquake in Haiti; ZTE also established the ZTE Special Children
'
Care Fund, the largest charity fund in China."210
Traditionally, corruption was not necessarily viewed as the center of CSR
responsibilities, touching instead on enterprise obligations to the state and
constrained by the ambiguous line between traditional relationships and
illegal practices.211 But recent changes in Chinese policy2 12 and

law213

ought

to have brought anti-corruption efforts to the forefront of ZTE's operations.
Corruption is now understood as a significant breach of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) basic line and has become a serious violation of law
and administrative practice. Within China itself, the government has been
moving swiftly against corporate leaders in large state owned enterprises in
the context of the government's broadening anti-corruption campaigns.214

Because most heads of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are also
members of the Communist Party, discipline in anti-corruption
215
investigations usually starts with CCP disciplinary systems.
But at their core, these investigations and the anti-corruption standards
that they are based are both domestic and based on internal policy. Fu
Hualing's recent work is instructive:216
210. About ZTE: Company Overview, ZTE, http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/aboutlcorporateinformation/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
211. Larry Cata Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility with Chinese Characteristics:PartII, L. AT
THE END OF THE DAY (July 9, 2012), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/corporatesocial-responsibility-with.html; Larry Cata Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility with Chinese
Characteristics,L. AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 9, 2011), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2011/11/corporate-social-responsibility-with.html; see, e.g., Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social
Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 64
(2010).
212. Larry Cati Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility with Chinese CharacteristicsPartIII: Wang
Maoling on CSR and the Communist Party Line in China yj~fvl
{lI
f I±tA
k'j
f L.
AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 29, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/
corporate -social -responsibility-with.html.
213. Larry Cata Backer, Zhang Lei on China's CriminalLaw and Anti-Corruption Strategies, L. AT
THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 1, 2016), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/zhang-lei-onchinas-criminal-law-and.html; Junfeng, et. al., Update on Anti-bribery and Anti-Corruption
Regulations and Enforcement in China, LEXOLOGY (May 21, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=ecfa940f-2f7a-4857-944b-3aba6b7e44cb.
214. See Jamil Anderlini, China CorruptionPurge Snares 115 SOE 'Tigers', FIN. TIMES (May 18,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ad997d5c-fd3 c-11e4-9e96-00144feabdcO#axzz3wZZJgce 1;
Gordon Orr, 5 Ways China'sState- Owned EnterprisesAre Adapting to the Downturn, MCKINSEY &
Co. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://mckinseychina.com/5 -ways-chinas-state -owned-enterprises -areadapting-to-the-downturn/; Shannon Tiezzi, China's State-Owned Companies Sweat as 'GraftBusters' Converge, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 13, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinasstate -owned-companies -sweat-as -graft-busters-converge/.
215. See, e.g., Anderlini, supra note 214.
216. See Hualing Fu, Wielding the Sword: PresidentXi's New Anti-Corruption Campaign, THE
Soc. Sci. RES. NETWORK, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2492407 (last
updatedJuly 8, 2015); id. at 136 155 ("I
ask whether China is developing a sui generis model for
anti -corruption enforcement that relies on a different control model .. .To quote Wang, the
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The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [(CCDI)] published
the criticism in an article on its website yesterday. It is the first of a
series on "pushing SOEs to strictly follow party discipline," as the
watchdog continues cracking down on corruption. The CCDI has
identified state-owned enterprises as its focus this year. Twenty-six such
businesses were visited in the agency's first round of inspections this
year, and another seventeen are currently under inspection.17
Still, it had never been clear that actions outside of China would produce
legal effects within China21s even with the enactment of anti-bribery laws.
And while as an official matter Chinese authorities had not foreclosed that
possibility, their actions suggested a focus on internal management, leaving
to host states and the international community the obligation to police and
discipline enterprises operating outside the national territory. The critical
challenge that approach produces, though, and one finally brought to center
stage with the Norges Bank decision, is the extent to which China will
continue to defer to such international disciplinary mechanisms when they
are projected to the internal operations of a Chinese SOE (though derived
from their external activities). That is, to what extent will China be open to
internationalized disciplinary mechanisms that might affect the scope and
framework of CSR related conduct of enterprises with potential effect within
China? The decision of the Norges Bank brings that question one step
closer to the necessity of resolution.
But the allegations that brought ZTE to the attention of the Norway
SWF were not corruption within China but corruption allegations in ZTE's
overseas operations. These countries included Algeria, Kenya, Papua New
Guinea, Zambia, and the Philippines.219 Lesser weight was given to
corruption allegations in a number of other states, including Malaysia,
Myanmar, Nigeria, and Liberia.220 This was not ZTE's first conflict with
Norwegian business and investment organs. In 2009, "'Norwegian
telecommunications giant Telenor banned for six months Chinese company
ZTE Corp. from participating in tenders and new business opportunities
because of an alleged breach of its code of conduct in a procurement

Party is using the anti -corruption campaign to buy the time that the Party needs to develop
sound anti-corruption institutions and tackle corruption at its root").
217. Nectar Gan & Keira Lu Huang, China's State-Owned Enterprises Slammed for Entrapping'
Officials into Corruption, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 14, 2015), https://
www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1838514/chinas-state-owned-enterprisesslammed-entrapping.
218. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Chinese SOEs in Latin America CSR and Culture, L. AT THE
END OF THE DAY (May 20, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/chinese-soes-inlatin-america-csr-and.html.
219. RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 6 10.
220. Id. at 10 12.
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'
proceeding,' international news agencies reported."221
It was reported in the
financial press that the issue leading to the action was tied to corruption:

[A]n industry source has told Light Reading that ZTE representatives
attempted to bribe Telenor officials in the course of a recent business
tender. ZTE says the problem was caused by a rogue employee. In a
statement emailed to Light Reading and attributed to the vendor's
CEO Yin Yimin, the company noted: "ZTE has a very clear Code of
Conduct and, as a listed company, our employees have to adhere to the
'
highest business standards."222
As has been its habit from the beginning of its operations, the Ethics
Council has sought to apply an internationalized standard, interpreted
through the lens of Norwegian state policy.223 It chose not to apply the laws
of the states in which the corruption allegations were alleged, but rather, as
has become customary in the context of managing conduct within
transnational production chains outside of the home states of enterprise
systems, 224 it applied an internationalized governance framework drawn from
international and transnational sources.
The UN anti-corruption portal TRACK (Tools and Resources for AntiCorruption Knowledge), Global Compact: A guide for anti-corruption
risk-assessment (2013), and the OECD's Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance (2010), provide useful
guidance in these matters. In Business Principles for Countering
Bribery, Transparency International (TI) has listed a number of general
recommendations for building robust compliance systems. 225
But the Ethics Council also sought to legitimize its approach by a passing
reference to Chinese state policy and law.226 The Council did not, however,
purport to apply Chinese law to the external operations of ZTE. This
preference for a single and coherent harmonized international law represents
a consistent approach by the Ethics Council and contributes to the
construction of a transnational governance legality that is intermeshed with,
but autonomous of, the national systems within which portions of
transnational actions are taken. It is in this sense that the Ethics Council
continues to contribute to the construction of transnational legal orders,
221. Carmela Fonbuena, Norways telco giant bans ZTE for 6 months, ABS-CBN NEws (Oct. 21
Oct., 2008), https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/10/21/08/norways-telco-giant-bans-zte-6months.

222. Ray Le Maistre, Telenor Bans ZTE From New Deals, LIGHT READING (Oct. 13, 2008),
http://www.lightreading.com/mobile/telenor-bans-zte-from-new-deals/d/d-id/662089#discuss.
223. See, Larry Cata Backer, Backer, Larry Cata. Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based
TransnationalRule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets., 29
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2013).

224. See Larry Cata Backer, Regulating Multinational Corporations Trends, Challenges, and

Opportunities, 22 BROWN J. OF WORLD AFFAIRS 153 173 (2015).
225. RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 12.
226. Id. at 12 13.
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however characterized.22 7 ZTE contributed to its own difficulties because,
like many other multinational enterprises, and SOEs it underestimates the
authority of actions undertaken by hybrid organs like the Ethics Council.228
It chose not to respond extensively to Ethics Council inquiries.229
The Council on Ethics reported, "In September, the Council had a
telephone meeting with an employee from ZTE's Security & Investor
Relations Department and an employee from the company's legal
department."230 The company also subsequently replied to an email
containing follow-up questions.231 In its replies, the company did not
comment on any of the specific corruption allegations, discussing only
232
its internal compliance and anti-corruption systems.
There might well have been good reason for this evasion.233 ZTE
executives might well have been considering the risks of giving any evidence
to a foreign organ like the Ethics Council for at least two reasons. 234 First, it
is not clear that such participation beyond purely judicial organs might
trigger investigation in China for violation of secrets laws.235 Second, the
extent to which ZTE officials provide evidence might be taken into account
by the Chinese Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and its
investigations of possible corruption in ZTE within China.236 This later risk
would carry substantial adverse consequences for high ZTE officials, and
they would likely err on the side of caution.237 The difficulty, though, is that
now that the Norges Bank has acted-and caused embarrassment to an
economic organ of the Chinese state-it is as likely to trigger a CCDI
investigation.238 ZTE will suffer double consequences: for failure to comply
227. See Larry Cata Backer, Are Supply Chains TransnationalLegal Orders?: What We Can Learn
From the Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse, IRVINE J. INT'L TRANSNAT'L & COMPARATIVE L.
11 (2016); Larry Cata Backer, The Emerging Normative Structures of TransnationalLaw: Non-State
Enterprises in PolycentricAsymmetric Global Orders, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2016).
228. Larry Cata Backer, Corruption and Investment-Chinese Company ZTE Corp. Excluded From
Norway Sovereign Wealth FundInvesment Universe, L. AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/corruption-and-investment-chinese.html [herinafter
Corruption and Investment].
229. Id. at 3.
230. RECOMMENDATION To EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 14.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Larry Cata Backer, From a "Two Thrust Approach" to a "Two Sword One Thrust Strategy" to
Combat Criminal Corruption: Corporate Compliance, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and Sovereign Investor
Oversight 1, 29 (Coalition for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper No. 9/1, 2017) [hereinafter From
a "Two Thrust Approach"].
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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with an increasingly coherent internationalized normative order on
corruption and the likely internal investigations that may follow in China.239
The extensiveness of the corruption, the ambiguity of corrective
measures, and the changes in Chinese policy all contributed to the
determination of an unacceptable risk supporting exclusion from the
investment universe. 240 But this determination should raise eyebrows as
wel.241 And it should raise eyebrows precisely because the determination is
potentially inconsistent with the approach to bribery and corruption-and
the role of the Norwegian Global Pension Fund-in the case of Siemens, a
company whose predilection for bribery as a sound business strategy was also
the subject of extensive consideration by Norges Bank, the Norway Finance
Ministry, and the Ethics Council.242 On the other hand, it mirrored the
action taken with a Chinese SOE-China Railway Group Ltd.243 In that
context, I noted:
The most interesting part of the recommendations was the recognition
by the Ethics Council of the Chinese government's recent anticorruption campaigns. Indeed, the corruption allegations arose out of
the Chinese government's investigation of a disastrous accident that
occurred on its high speed rail lines in 2011. The Chinese
government's efforts to deal with the corruption that may have
contributed to the accident were noted with approval, but those efforts
did little to aid CRG in avoiding exclusion. More interesting still was
that evidence relied on by the Council included "information relating to
legal rulings and internal disciplinary processes in the Communist Party
published in the Chinese Press." This might have raised eyebrows in
the West, because the Council specifically referenced the Chinese
Communist Party's system of shuanggui, a practice that has been
criticized in the West.244
239. Id.
240. RECOMMENDATION

TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 15 17.
241. From a "Two Thrust Approach", supra note 233, at 31.
242. Id.
243. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GoV'T PENSION FUND GLOBAL,
TO

EXCLUDE CHINA

RAILWAY

GROUP LTD.

FROM

RECOMMENDATION

THE INVESTMENT UNIVERSE

OF

THE

FUND GLOBAL (Oct. 10, 2014), http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/02/
Recommendation- CRG- 10 -October-2 014.pdf.
GOVERNMENT

PENSION

244. Larry Cata Backer, Change Comes to the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund Global, L. AT THE
30, 2015), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/change -comes -tonorwegian-sovereign.html; see Larry Cata Backer & Keren Wang, The Emerging Structures of
END OF THE DAY (Jan.

Socialist Constitutionalism With Chinese Characteristics: Extra Judicial Detention (Laojia and

Shuanggui) and the Chinese Constitutional Order, 23(2) PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 251 (2014), for a
discussion of the broader constitutional issue; see Larry Cata Backer & Keren Wang,
n 01~ ±h p ft , {YW1
r 'J 9i V1tfr7 ~TtP Rt'
$1 1J 0 l~ , 1TIt4 t I'~
CHINA L. R. 207 (2015 *
4 IT (0,M 8 q ), available at http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/08-08-%/E5%/ A4%96%E8%/AF%9 1.pdf, for the Chinese
language version.
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But, exclusion may reflect a pragmatic determination.245 That pragmatism
might be grounded in an assessment of the willingness of the enterprise to
respond favorably to observation status and to the exercise of shareholder
rights by an instrumentality of the Norwegian Crown.246 It appears clear
that Siemens was amenable to that exercise of private shareholder activismbut unlikely that a Chinese SOE or a Chinese hybrid entity, like ZTE,
would be as compliant.247 That suggests not so much discrimination on the
basis of enterprise origin as a hard headed assessment of corporate
willingness to cooperate. 24s But this trend bears watching.249
One wonders, however, why this approach makes any sense in the case of
corruption. This would have presented an opportunity for Norges Bank to
robustly exercise its shareholder power in ways that are directly tied to the
long term maximization of the value of the enterprise in which investment is
made.
In effect, Siemens permitted the Norwegian state to become an
important monitor and standard setter for the scope, content, and
operation of its monitoring and surveillance regimes. This marks a
substantial departure from the traditional arrangement in which
corporations, subject to the legal constraints of the state of
incorporation-at least with respect to its internal organization,
operation, and management-now subjects those core organizational
features to regulation by a foreign state through interventions in private
markets. What once was the province of the state through law has now
become the province of the state through market interactions producing
governance principals with the functional effect of law.250
And it might have permitted the Norwegian State, through the Norges Bank
to reach deeply into the conduct of production chains in those developing
states where legal and governance internationalization is most clearly
targeted. 251 And it might have been used to align Chinese approaches to
corruption to the international standards with which it is, in some respect,
quite similar.252 But all of these opportunities were lost by the determination
to take the traditional approach, to retreat from a more positive exercise of
investor power and greater fidelity to the project of legal internationalism
245. From a "Two Thrust Approach", supra note 233, at 31.
246. Id.

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Larry Cata Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview and Application of

Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate Systems, in

BEYOND TERRITORIALITY:

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87

Zekoll Joachin eds., 2012), for a general discussion.
251. From a "Two Thrust Approach", supra note 233, at 32.

252. Id.
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within production chains that much of the effort of the Ethics Council is
directed.253
B.

PETROBRAS254

Norges Bank has decided to place Petroleo Brasileiro SA ("Petrobras")25
under observation because of the risk of severe corruption.256 Petrobras is
one of the largest state owned petroleum TNCs in Latin America25 7 and one
that is deeply embedded in corruption investigations'58 (including the write
off of over $2 billion in bribe payments that reached all the way to the office
of the President of the Republic).259 The decision is based on the
recommendation submitted by the Council on Ethics for the Government
Pension Fund Global.260
The decision stands in stark contrast to the January 7, 2016, decision by
Norges Bank to exclude the Chinese company ZTE Corporation,261 one of
the world's five largest producers of telecommunications equipment and
network solutions, based on an assessment of the risk of severe corruption.262
The two decisions together may help begin to make coherent whatever rules
may be emerging about the obligations of the NPFG in matters of
corruption under internationalized standards that it invokes. Especially
important may be emerging rules for determining when corruption may
253. Id.
254. See Larry Cata Backer, Incoherence or Discretion in Corruption and Investment Approaches?
The Norwegian Pension Fund Global Places Petroleo BrasileiroSA (Petrobras)under observation, L. AT
THE END OF THE DAY

(Feb. 2, 2016), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/incoherence-

in-corr-uption-and.html [hereinafter Incoherence or Discretion].
255. Larry Cata Backer, Should Financial Institutions Have Obligations to Manage the Human
Rights Impacts of their Clients?: "FinalStatement Friends of the Earth Europe and Friends of the Earth

Netherlands/Milieudefensie Rabobank", L.

AT THE END OF THE DAY

(Jan. 21, 2016), http://

lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/should-financial-institutions-have.html.
256. COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND, RECOMMENDATION
COMPANY IN

THE GOVERNMENT

PENSION FUND

TO PUT A

GLOBAL UNDER OBSERVATION: PETROLEO

BRASILEIRO SA 1 (Dec. 21, 2015), https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/RecommendationPetrobras-21-December-2015.pdf.
257. See Capital Ownership, PETROBRAS (2014), http://www.investidorpetrobras.com.br/en/
corporate -governance/capital-ownership.
258. Paul Kiernan, Brazil's PetrobrasReports Nearly $17 Billion in Asset and Corruption Charges:
State-run oil company writes off $2.1 billion of alleged bribe payments, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-petrobras-reports-nearly- 17-billion-impairment-onassets-corruption-1429744336; see, e.g., Corruption in Brazil: The Big Oily: The Petrobrasscandal
explained, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2014/12/30/
the-big-oily.

259. See Michelle Mark, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Cleared in Petrobras Corruption
Scandal, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/brazilian-president-dilmarousseff-cleared-petrobras-corruption-scandal-2146773.
260. RECOMMENDATION TO PUT A COMPANY IN THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL
UNDER OBSERVATION: PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA, supra note 256, at 17.
261. Corruption and Investment, supra note 228, at 1.

262. Id.
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trigger greater use of shareholder rights and when it triggers a decision to
exclude from investment. To the extent that these decisions do not add
clarity, they will serve the developing international consensus on the
corporate responsibility to avoid corruption and the consequential
obligation of investors to police the conduct of the enterprises in which they
invest.
Petrobras represented the second opportunity for the Ethics Council and
Norges Bank to speak to the issue of corruption and to further refine an
articulation of a set of principles under which a financial institution (or even
an institutional investor) might comply with its responsibility to respect
human rights (Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights)263 as
applied through its investor code of ethics (the Pension Fund Global's
Ethical Guidelines).264 It is emerging that, at least under the Organziation
for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) framework
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, financial institutions assume at
least some minimal level of responsibility for the human rights detrimental
conduct of clients.265 And corruption has been identified as falling within
that responsibility both within international soft law and under the Pension
Fund Global's Ethical Guidelines.266
But the application of those responsibilities to specific instances has not
yet produced a coherent jurisprudence. Much less has it started to develop a
set of decisions that might provide guidance to enterprises about the
standards applied by Ethics Council and Bank to issues of corruption that
could result in no action, in observation status, or in exclusion from
investment. In the most recent case, on January 7, 2016, Norges Bank
decided to exclude the Chinese company ZTE Corporation, one of the
world's five largest producers of telecommunications equipment and
network solutions, from the investment universe of the GPFG.267 The
company is excluded based on an assessment of the risk of severe
corruption.268 But, in the Petrobras decision, the Council and the Bank
chose observation rather than exclusion.269
One of the more important aspects of the Ethics Council determination is
its discussion (and further construction) of the nature of the
internationalized standards of corporate responsibility to eliminate
263. U.N.
AND

HuM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS

HUMAN

RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS "PROTECT, RESPECT AND

U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, U.N. Sales No. 13.XIV.5 (2012).
supra note 143.
265. See Larry Cata Backer, Should FinancialInstitutions Have Obligations to Manage the Human
Rights Impacts of their Clients?: "FinalStatement Friends of the Earth Europe and Friends of the Earth
REMEDY" FRAMEWORK,

264.

GUIDELINES,

Netherlands/Milieudefensie Rabobank", L.

AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan.

21, 2016, 6:3 1PM),

http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/should-financial-institutions-have.html.
266. GUIDELINES, supra note 143, at 2.
267. Corruption and Investment, supra note 228, at 1.

268. Id.
269.

RECOMMENDATION TO PUT A COMPANY IN THE GOVERNMENT

UNDER OBSERVATION: PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA,

PENSION

supra note 256, at 17.
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corruption.270 The touchstone, again, is not the law of the home
jurisdiction-Brazil-but an internationalized normative set of soft law and
guidelines that are treated as setting a regulatory baseline against which
corporate conduct is to be judged. Footnote thirty-three is particularly
important as a window on the nature of the regulatory structures within
which the jurisprudence of the Ethics Guidelines is developed.2 71 In a way, it
suggests the way in which transnational institutions have begun to treat as
irrelevant the jurisdictional and legalist borders that once were central to the
integrity and application of law systems. 272 In its place, one sees the
construction of a transnational legal order that draws, without much
distinction, among the laws of states, international conventional law,
transnational normative standards and guidelines and quasi regulatory tool
kits (the cookbooks of legal, regulatory managerialism) in crafting an
interpretive international law of corruption that it then applies. The
touchstone here, like that in traditional European Court of Human Rights
"margin of appreciation" jurisprudence, is to determine a consensus
position, which is then applied in context. 273 Conversely, this approach
would appear to provide a wider margin of discretion in the absence of
consensus-and that margin might then look more closely either on the
internal governance framework of the enterprise or the law of the domestic
legal order in which this internal corporate governance framework is
implemented.
More important, perhaps, is that the object is not necessarily to eliminate
corruption but to reduce it to what will be deemed to acceptable standards.
That produces two quite important approaches to Ethics Council
judgements. The first is an emphasis on formalism. Like the Delaware
courts development of a monitoring duty of care for corporate boards, the
Ethics Council places strong emphasis is on the formal construction of
systems that are deemed minimally robust. That robustness is judged against
the international standards, not the laws of the home state or the state in
which corruption is alleged. The second is an emphasis on
implementation.274
The key requirements in international standards for corporate
compliance and anti-corruption systems relevant to this case are that
the company conducts a comprehensive assessment of corruption risks
in its business operations, that the company has zero tolerance for
corruption, that all employees are equipped with tools to avoid
270. Id. at 7-9.
271. Id. at 8 n.33.
272. Id.
273. Larry Cata Backer, Inscribing Judicial Preferences into Our Basic Law: The Political
Jurisprudence of European Margins of Appreciation As ConstitutionalJurisprudence in the U.S., 7
TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 327, 338 (2000).
274. See Incoherence or Discretion, supra note 254.
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becoming involved in corruption, and that relevant processes and
75
procedures are continuously developed and improved.2
The Ethics Council, then, does not look to actual elimination but rather to
the willingness of the enterprise to devise and apply anti-corruption
systems. 276 The assessment of the willingness of an enterprise to embrace
these twin standards, and an assessment of an enterprise's willingness to
apply them, might suggest the difference in treatment between Petrobras
and ZTE Corp.277
But equally important might be the way in which the exercise of discretion
played a role in the difference in decision between Petrobras and ZTE
Corp.278 In both cases, the companies operated in places with either weak
governance or a higher propensity to tolerate corruption.279 Applying
international normative standards, that context then places "special
requirements on the company to have in place robust systems and
implement anti-corruption measures."280 In Petrobras, the Ethics Council
determined that its 2013 corruption system overhaul plus international
public and private pressure-states and markets-would have a significant
effect on the company's willingness to enforce its new system. 281 In ZTE,
neither a sufficiently robust system nor a perceived internal or external
disciplinary structure was deemed sufficient.282 Petrobras, then, was judged
more willing to engage in anti-corruption work sensitive to the international
standards the Ethics Council embraced; ZTE Corp. was not. Note that the
difference was not one of compliance-both companies faced a similar
degree of temptation, but rather it was based on a sense of likelihood of
movement in the right direction.
Surprisingly absent from the discussion in either cases was the degree to
which participation in the internal governance of either Petrobras or ZTE
by the Pension Fund Global might contribute toward reform, and thus make
the case stronger for observation. The Ethics Council, inexplicably, treats
observation as a sort of passive act. It is a state of watching-and if the
company thereafter fails-of action in the form of exclusion
recommendations. Yet that substantially ignores the value of observation, a
275. See

RECOMMENDATION TO PUT A COMPANY IN THE GOVERNMENT

PENSION FUND

SA, supra note 256; see generally
OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS 10 14
(2013), available at https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-CorruptionEthicsCompliance
Handbook.pdf.
276. RECOMMENDATION TO PUT A COMPANY IN THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL
UNDER OBSERVATION: PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA, supra note 256, at 9 11.
277. RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 6 10; id. at 13.
278. Incoherence or Discretion, supra note 254, at 3.
279. Id.
280. See Larry Cata Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility in Weak Governance Zones, 14 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 297 (2016), for a general discussion.
281. RECOMMENDATION TO PUT A COMPANY IN THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL
UNDER OBSERVATION: PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA, supra note 256, at 12.
282. RECOMMENDATION TO EXCLUDE ZTE, supra note 201, at 15 16.
GLOBAL

UNDER OBSERVATION:

PETROLEO

BRASILEIRO
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value that was more clearly specified in Siemens. The object of observation
is hardly just to watch. It is meant to provide the Pension Fund Global an
opportunity to engage, to participate in the internal governance of the
enterprise, and to help it reach decisions in its operations that are compatible
with the requirements of the Ethics Guidelines, and therefore with
international consensus standards (or, effectively, law). To fail to
acknowledge this represents either an omission, or a retreat from the
principles of using private shareholder power. And, indeed, as an investor,
and as ZTE might make clear-the Pension Fund Global has a
responsibility under the very internationalized standards it applies, to
comply with them itself. In this case, it would require specifying in more
detail the sorts of obligations (responsibilities) the Pension Fund Global
must undertake under international standards to ensure that its observation
of Petrobras is itself compatible with those standards.
What else might account for the difference between Petrobras and ZTE
that induced Council and Bank to exclude the Chinese company and place
the Brazilian company under observation? At one level, one might consider
whether the difference is based on unconscious presumptions about the
amenability to corruption and to correction of the states in which these
companies are headquartered. One could read the determinations as
suggesting a presumption that Chinese companies have little prospect for
correction and a strong incentive toward corruption, while Brazilian
companies may have similar incentives toward corruption but might be more
amenable to correction. But this would be amount to a jurisprudence of
prejudice rather than of law and hardly to be tolerated by a state institution.
On the other hand, it might well indicate a difference in the sort of relations
between investors and state-owned enterprises that itself might inform
decisions about the utility of exercising shareholder power. One
understands better the value of shareholder power in Petrobras than perhaps
in ZTE Corp., and that might have played into the decision. For Chinese
SOEs and related entities, that may be an important consideration as they
seek financing from investors even more deeply tied to global standards of
assessment of investment propriety, grounded in consensus norms that these
companies might otherwise reject.
Perhaps it was the level of information available to the Ethics Council and
the level of cooperation afforded. Petrobras appeared more willing to
engage the Ethics Council, and in any case, more information was available
to the Council and Bank about a very public scandal touching on a crown
jewel of Brazilian state enterprises. In contrast, ZTE Corp. did little to help
its own case, and its corruption appeared far more systemic. But that is to
some extent conjecture. Still, an indication of cooperation might provide a
sufficient basis to choose observation rather than exclusion if only for
practical reasons-the enterprise would be easier to monitor and its progress
easier to assess than with an enterprise that appeared unwilling to cooperate
even against a state sector investor shareholder. Yet Petrobras is not
Siemens, and the level of cooperation might be understood as hardly
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satisfactory. It would do the Ethics Council well to develop better and more
evenly applied standards for measuring cooperation and the consequences
for choosing among remedies and approaches when confronted with a
significant breach of its Ethics Guidelines.283
C.

SHARPENING THE SWORD: INSTITUTIONAL TRENDSSOVEREIGN INVESTING AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTER

The NPFG's latest decisions, ones that seek to broaden its institutional
role in the development of robust anti-corruption compliance programs
among companies in which it has an ownership interest, are unremarkable in
and of themselves. What draws attention is what appears to be a difference
in the approach of the Ethics Council, on the one hand, and Norges Bank,
on the other, with respect to the use of investment power to institutionalize
corporate governance behaviors. The differences between the Ethics
Council and Norges Bank now appear with greater clarity as the cultures
within the Ethics Council-with a focus on the Ethics guidelines and
normative objectives-and the cultures within Norges Bank, with a greater
emphasis on more pragmatic approaches to objectives, appear to diverge.284
But, the divergences do not suggest fundamental differences, but rather
differences in approaches to the leveraging of Norwegian power through
investment within a context in which that political agenda must also generate
profits to the Norwegian Kingdom.285
This is most apparent in the context of corruption-an area of increasing
concern to the Pension Fund Global.286 The Ethics Council went out of its
way to provide a public explanation of its actions-and the institutional
cultures that produced them, in contradistinction to the work of the Norges
Bank to which it reports. 287 The emphasis was on the constraints imposed
by the nature of the Ethics Council's work. 288 These highlighted a
substantial rift in the utility of approaches that might be available to
sovereign investors in the anti-corruption area. On the one hand, the Ethics
Council was constrained by the law that vested it with authority to make one
of three decisions: no action, observation, or exclusion. The Norges Bank,
on the other hand, as administrator of the NPFG had a broader discretionakin to the administrative discretion of prosecutors under PBO-to exercise
a broader range of administrative power, including the power to exercise
shareholder rights for public policy ends.
283. See Incoherence or Discretion, supra note 254, at 3.

284. Larry Cata Backer, The Battle Between Regulatory and ManagerialApproaches Within the
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund The Case of Corruption, L. AT THE END OF THE DAY (May 9,
2017), http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-battle-between-regulatory-and.html.
285. Id. at 1 2.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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This is reflected in the decisions rendered in 2016. In two cases, the
Ethics Council recommended exclusion from the NPFG investment
universe;289 the Norges Bank rejected the recommendation in favor of the
more flexible discipline of observation.290 In another two cases, the Ethics
Council recommended the more formal penalty of observation. In both
cases, the Norges Bank opted for the more discretionary power to exercise
shareholder power and influence over the companies to get them to engage
in appropriate reform.291 The Ethics Council noted that although the
Council perceives the exercise of shareholder rights and observation to be
extremely similar measures, it cannot recommend the exercise of
shareholder rights. This is primarily because NBIM is responsible for the
exercise of shareholder rights,292 while the Council on Ethics is responsible
for observation.293
What emerges is a sense that the Ethics Council continues to develop a
culture of formalist compliance built around the Ethics Guidelines. Their
approach is more regulatory and bounded by the techniques of the
administrator and the legislator. There is little flexibility, no sense of the
value, or utility of discretionary action. These naturally follow from the
structures of their mandate and the character of their activities-quasijudicial and administrative. The Ethics Council is deeply embedded in the
public law cultures of the state. The Norges Bank, on the other hand, is
more administrative and functional. It is grounded in contextual flexibility
and in the informal use of power to attain objectives. The Norges Bank is
much more deeply embedded within the private law cultures of the
289. See Leonardo SpA,

COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND

5, 2017), https://etikkradet.no/leonardo-spa-2/; PetroChinaCo Ltd.,
THE GoV'T PENSION FUND

ltd-4/.
290. See

COUNCIL

ON

GLOBAL
ETHICS

GLOBAL

(May

COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR

(Aug. 17, 2018), https://etikkradet.no/petrochina-coFOR

THE

GOV'T

PENSION

FUND

GLOBAL,

SPA FROM THE GPFG 21 (2016), https://
0
etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Leonardo-Tilr% C3%
oA5dning-ENG-2016.pdf;
COUNCIL
ON
RECOMMENDATION
ETHICS FOR THE

TO EXCLUDE LEONARDO

GOV'T PENSION

FUND

GLOBAL,

RECOMMENDATION

TO EXCLUDE

GPFG 11 (2016), https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/
PetroChina-Tilr%C3 %A5dning-ENG-2016.pdf.
291. See COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND
GLOBAL,
RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE ENI SPA ON OBSERVATION 14 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://
0
etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Eni-Tilro C3%
[hereinafter
0 A5dning-ENG-2016.pdf
RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE ENI SPA ON OBSERVATION]; COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE
GOV'T PENSION FUND
GLOBAL, RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE SAIPEM SPA UNDER
OBSERVATION
18 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/SaipemTilr%C3%A5dning-ENG-2016-.pdf.
292. See Responsibility, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) ("Our tools for active ownership are dialogue with companies,
investors, regulators and other standard setters, voting at shareholder meetings and filing
shareholder proposals."); see generally COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND
PETROCHINA

Co. LTD. FROM THE

GLOBAL, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 32 68 (2016), https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/
2c3377d07c5a4c4fbd442b345e7cfd67/government-pension-fund-global -responsibleinvestment-2016.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT].
293. See RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 292, at 87.
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enterprise. This makes for an interesting contrast between an institution
that functions within the borders of politics and law, and another that
functions within the constraints of economics and markets.294
This is particularly apparent in the quite distinct approaches of the Ethics
Council and Norges Bank with respect to Eni S.p.A.295 and Saipem S.p.A.,296
both of which the Ethics Council recommended formal observation. This
recommendation was essentially institutional and political-it was grounded
on the role of the Pension Fund Global as a regulatory actor demanding
oversight over conduct. Instead, Norges Bank chose the mechanics of
private shareholding to move toward what one can expect to be a similar
objective.29 7 The Ethics Council put the best face on it that it could-noting
that there was little functional difference between observation and exercise
of shareholder power. And yet that functional similarity does little to hide
the substantial formal difference between a regulatory approach grounded in
normative political frameworks, and a managerial approach grounded in
normative economic frameworks. From the perspective of the construction
of regulatory frameworks for conduct, the consequences could be quite
substantial. The former constructs corruption as a political issue with legal
effects disciplined by the institutions of state; the latter constructs corruption
as an economic issue with compliance effects disciplined by the market.298
IV. Conclusion: From "Two Thrusts" to "Two Swords, One
Thrust" Approaches and their Value to Chinese AntiCorruption Efforts
What can China learn from these emerging trends in the area of the
criminalization of corruption and of international efforts to manage
corporate compliance programs that enhance a more effective system of
public-private cooperation in combatting corruption, especially bribery?
Corruption has become an important element of both national and
transnational governance. It is particularly complicated because coherence
among all of the participants in global production chains are necessary in
order to ensure that the production chain itself remains free of corruption.
But that, in turn, requires both coherence in approach to corruption (how it
manifests) and a willingness to privatize corruption enforcement across
border. Alternatively, and less efficiently, dominant states might seek to
project their own anti-corruption regimes outward through their control (to
294. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Summaiy of My Presentation, "The Privatization of
Governance: Emerging Trends and Actors," for Conference: New International Trade and Rules

Between Globalization and Anti-Globalization, L.

AT THE END OF THE DAY

(Apr. 29, 2017, 9:34

PM), http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/summary-of-my-presentation.html.

295. See

RECOMMENDATION TO PLACE ENI

SPA

ON OBSERVATION,

supra note 291, at 14.

296. Id. at 18.
297. Sapiem SpA, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOV'T PENSION FUND GLOBAL (Aug. 17,
2018), https://etikkradet.no/saipem-spa-2/; see Eni SpA, COUNCIL ON ETHICS FOR THE GOVT
PENSION FUND
GLOBAL (May 5, 2017), https://etikkradet.no/eni-spa-2/.
298. See Incoherence or Discretion, supra note 254, for a general discussion.
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the extent of such control in any case) of apex enterprises in production
chains, especially through legal and prosecutorial actions. As an additional
option, dominant states and their investment instruments (like the
Norwegian Pension Fund Global) might seek to project an internationalized
conception of anti-corruption law and standards outward. In either case,
projection of anti-corruption standards may be done directly, through law,
or indirectly, through the encouragement of societally (privatized)
mechanisms for corruption control, through markets critical to the
functioning of relevant production chains.
The effect, as has become evident in this article, is the development of
what can best be understood as another manifestation of a "Two Thrust
Approach" in a specific context-the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to
develop robust compliance systems, enhance cooperation, and encourage
remediation and the exercise of discretion in the management of sovereign
investments through SWFs to the same ends. But these two thrusts are
uncoordinated, and they do not enhance the productive value of the other.
Indeed, their great weakness appears to be that jurisdictions capable of
exercising the sovereign investment thrust are not, at the same time, the
most valuable for implementing the governmental criminal prosecution
thrust. At the same time, the natural coordination of both approaches
suggests the value of coordination. Both "thrusts" focus on corporate
cooperation, voluntary disclosure, remediation, and most importantly,
robust compliance programs to ensure the development of anti-corruption
cultures within the enterprise and of vigorous systems for policing
corruption. Together they provide a great incentive-declinations (formal
exercise of discretion to close an investigation without charges)299 and
exercise of shareholder power by sovereign investors or observation-to
avoid criminal investigation and to reform corporate internal governance to
reduce the likelihood of criminal activity.300
What that suggests is a natural alignment in states, like China, that have
significant prosecutorial as well as sovereign investment capacities. Aligning
the basic policy of both the U.S. Justice Department's pilot program and the
NPFG of voluntary disclosure, cooperation, remediation, and
disgorgement,301 it is possible to develop a two-prong and coherent approach
to policing corruption. The object would not be to copy and amalgamate,
but rather to draw on the regulatory approaches to craft a coordinated dual
thrust policy compatible with local law and political principles. That policy
would achieve the objectives of the criminal law-to punish wrongdoers and
299. Declinations, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
pilot-program/declinations. See generally Richard L. Cassin, Hey, Declinations WITHOUT
Disgorgement Are Still Popular, too, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 8, 2017, 8:18 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/8/hey-declinations-without-disgorgement-are-still-populartoo.html.
300. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FCPA CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT POLICY 5 (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/83 8416/download.
301. See Cassin, supra note 299.
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deter the commission of offenses. But it would also meet the political and
societal objectives of fostering changes in consensus about the character of
corporate governance. Those objectives are grounded in robust
compliance32 but also in a cooperative relationship between the state and
enterprises.
China might well be able to profit from turning a "Two Thrust Approach"
into a "Two Sword One Thrust" strategy. That would require the
development of a capacity to use the Chinese sovereign wealth funds
proactively in a coordinated effort to ensure the development of compliance,
disclosure, and cooperation systems that would be policed both from the
criminal side, through the usual state officials, and from the financial side,
through the power of sovereign investors to flex their muscles. At the same
time, it would require a distinct approach to the criminal prosecution of
corruption-one that still focuses on appropriate punishment but also sees
the value in arrangements that advance the important goal of prevention.
And, indeed, it would seem that such an effort, the creation of a socialist
form of deferred prosecution and cooperation agreement, would be quite
useful in advancing socialist modernization through law. There are, of
course, conceptual and implementation challenges that must be addressed.
But the basic concept-the ability to coordinate economic and police power
to effect substantial advances in corporate governance with respect to
corruption and to broaden the base for enforcement of anti-corruption
rules-is an opportunity that would be worth seizing.
Indeed, China is well positioned to seize the opportunity. Within China it
may be possible to coordinate compliance efforts by the procuratorate with
that of the Chinese sovereign wealth funds through the medium of social
credit systems currently being developed. The parameters for developing
rating systems for corporate compliance in the area of corporate social
responsibility is already well advanced in the West.303 Indeed, "Western
versions of social credit-of providing ratings grounded in targeted data
harvesting, proprietary algorithms, and coordinated incentives and punishmentshas become an important regulatory element in the societal field."304 It
requires converting the system of exercising discretion, based on the factors
specified in Section II of this article and the factors for determining
compliance with sovereign investing compliance requirements discussed in
302. Andrew Brading Spalding, Restoring Pre-Existing Compliance Through the FCPA Pilot
Program, 48 U. ToL. L. REv. 519, 523 524 (2017).
303. See Larry Cata Backer, Social Credit in the West: Non-State Rating Systems for CSR

Compliance, L.

AT
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(Sept. 16, 2017), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/

2017/09/social-credit-in-west-non-state-rating.html (discussing EcoVaid, First Annual CSR
Performance Index (2017)).
304. See generally Credit ratings: how Fitch, Moody's and S&P rate each country, THE GUARDIAN:
DATABLOG (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/apr/30/creditratings-country-fitch-moodys-standard. See Larry Cata Backer, Next Generation Law: Data
Driven Governance and Accountability Based Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit
Regimes in China 1, 34 (July 7, 2018) (unpublished essay), https://papers.ssrn.com]/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstract id=3209997.
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Part III of this article, into the components of a rating system of corporate
compliance. Data can be required from enterprises that can support rating,
and the algorithms for transforming data into rating can then follow, based
on the assessment by the relative worth of each factor. The compliance
social credit rating, then, can be used by both the procuratorate and
sovereign investors to make determinations. That can substantially reduce
both the possibility of abuses of discretion in individual cases and can
regularize the process of discretionary decision-making. Thus for example,
different social credit rating thresholds can lead to different enforcement
strategies within the procuratorate (as well as different sentencing
guidelines), and it can also produce incentives that may reduce the cost of
accessing financial markets.
These are, of course, preliminary observations. Each requires substantial
study. In the end, some may not prove suitable. Yet what clearly emerges is
that in these cases, especially with respect to policy coordination and the
management of anti-corruption systems, there may be more efficient ways
for government, in partnership with private actors, to order their regulatory
approaches. It is also possible that such new approaches can remain faithful
to the rule of law and core principles of political organization without
limiting the forms of regulation to ancient forms more suitable for a
different age. In this new historical stage, it may be necessary to change with
the times and to adjust the forms of law to the contemporary customs and
practices of a society.
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